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According to Swaziland’s National Development Strategy, the country’s objectives are to improve 
the standard of living of all citizens, eradicate poverty, create employment, enhance gender 
equality and improve the country’s human development ranking from a low human development 
rank to a high human development rank by 2022. Persistent poverty and the unequal distribution 
of income have, however, posed significant challenges for the country in achieving these 
development goals.  
 
This study assessed the extent to which the government of Swaziland has been able to use its 
fiscal policy, in particular the tax and public expenditure policies on health and education, to 
redistribute resources and reduce income inequality. The study also investigated the incidence of 
out-of-pocket expenses incurred by households in accessing public health and education facilities. 
Based on both the Swaziland Household Income and Expenditure Survey data collected in the 
2010 national survey and the government’s 2010 budget, the study found that the tax policy had 
had a slight redistributive effect, as the Gini coefficient, had dropped from 0.7909 (pre-tax income 
distribution) to 0.7424 (post-tax income distribution). Public expenditure on education improved 
the income of poor households by 32.83 per cent and had led to a further reduction in the Gini to 
0.7185; however, public expenditure on tertiary education was poorly targeted as rich households 
were deriving a higher benefit than poor households. Out-of-pocket expenses on health were not 
regressive despite the fact that there was a low usage of health facilities by the low income 
households. On the other hand, education out-of-pocket expenses were found to be regressive and 
had a negative impact on the progression rates from primary education to higher learning 
institutions in the low income households.  
 
Overall it would appear that the country’s fiscal policy has led to a reduction in the country’s 
income inequality. However, the country has not made significant progress towards the 
achievement of its development goals, with the 2010 national household survey revealing that the 
poverty rate was still relatively high at 0.630, while the 2010 labour force survey revealed that 
unemployment was still high at 0.406 and the 2014 human development report showed that the 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1. 1 Research Area 
The unequal distribution of resources within populations has been a cause for concern over 
the years, especially in view of its persistency despite efforts on the part of governments to 
minimise the extent of such inequality.  
Achieving a pattern of income distribution that is deemed desirable by policymakers 
and acceptable to society is the objective of a fiscal policy as the policy enables social 
cohesion, political stability, and the entire society to participate in the overall 
economic growth notwithstanding the varying levels of contribution from the different 
groups in society (UNCTAD, 2012:113). 
In view of the fact that income inequality impacts on the economy and the people’s welfare, 
addressing it requires intervention from government through various mechanisms. Van der 
Berg & Moses (2009) identify one such mechanism as the government’s budget; they state 
that the budget is a translation of the government’s redistributive policies into monetary terms 
as it reflects the services that the government provides, to whom the services are provided, 
how the provision of these services is financed and the impact of the long-term distribution on 
human capital. There is substantial evidence that high levels of inequality are detrimental to 
the achievement of macro-economic stability and growth; hence, the need to implement a 
fiscal policy that promotes the redistribution of resources and supports sustainable economic 
growth (International Monetary Fund, 2014).  
 
The International Monetary Fund (2014) further recommends that tax and expenditure 
policies be designed in such a manner that they ensure the balancing of the distributional and 
efficiency objectives even during periods of fiscal consolidation. Inequality remains an 
economic challenge for Swaziland despite the several policy reforms that the government has 
adopted in an effort to redistribute resources. This study reviewed the country’s fiscal policy 
and the extent to which this policy redistributed resources across the population and also 
assessed whether these policies are progressive. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
The problem statement is as follows: To measure the redistributive impact of Swaziland’s tax 






1.3 Purpose and Significance of the Research 
According to Christiaensen and Angwafo (2013), significant strides have been observed in 
Africa’s economic growth despite the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 food crisis; 
nevertheless high levels of inequality continue to exist, inhibiting the achievement of other 
socio-economic objectives. This persistent inequality requires governments to develop fiscal 
policies that will help promote the achievement of objectives that are aimed at improving the 
welfare of the nations. It is, thus, incumbent on African governments to consider adopting 
progressive tax policies with minimal impact on the poor and also invest in social spending 
that will result in greater resource redistribution. According to Haughton & Khandker (2009), 
incidence analysis helps to determine who bears the burden of taxes and who benefits from 
government spending, as this information is required in the formulation of a tax and 
expenditure policy.  
 
The purpose of this study was, to determine whether Swaziland’s fiscal policy has been 
effective in promoting the redistribution of resources in order to reduce income inequality. In 
addition, the study assessed whether the fiscal policy was aligned with the country’s human 
capital development objectives set out in the National Development Strategy. The study 
determined the extent to which Swaziland’s tax policy supports the redistribution of resources 
and assessed the extent to which the public expenditure programmes on education and health 
support the redistribution of resources and, therefore, reduce inequality. The review of the 
country’s tax policy and the public expenditure policy was meant to ascertain the extent to 
which government’s spending supports an equitable distribution of resources. Martinez-
Vazquez (2004) stated that, the ability of a country’s tax policy is limited in improving 
income distribution on its own; as it needs to be complemented by a public expenditure policy 
that includes programmes directed at improving the equitable distribution of resources and 
providing services that the private markets are failing to provide in an optimal way. Lastly, 
the study reviewed the combined incidence of the tax and public expenditure policies in order 
to assess their progressivity and redistributive effect.  
 
Studies have shown that economic growth is important for poverty reduction; Naschold 
(2002) indicated that high levels of inequality make economic growth less effective in 
reducing poverty. In order to overcome this effect Naschold (2002) recommends the 
implementation of policies that promote the redistribution of income as a reduction in 






2000, Millennium Development Goals were developed and Goal No. 1 was to eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger; according to United Nations (2015), Sub-Saharan Africa 
achieved the lowest poverty reduction of 28 percentage points from a poverty rate of 57 per 
cent in 1990 to a rate of 41 per cent in 2015. The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (2014) however revealed that, Africa’s initial conditions when the Millennium 
Development Goals were set also had an impact on the progress made by the region as at that 
time, Africa had the highest level of poverty due to low development, weak infrastructure, 
conflict, instability and high levels of inequality. In his study Mubila etal. (2012) also learnt 
that within the African continent, Southern Africa showed the highest level of inequality 
when compared to the other regions in the continent and Swaziland was one of the top 10 
most unequal countries in the region. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa has been showing positive economic growth in the past decade; this 
growth has however not led to the desired poverty reduction, United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (2014). United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2014) also 
alludes to the fact that high levels of inequality that prevail in Sub-Saharan African countries 
have impeded the ability of economic growth to reduce poverty. Due to the fact that 
Swaziland is also still struggling with poverty reduction with a poverty rate of 0.63 as at the 
last national household survey carried out in 2010, assessing whether Swaziland’s fiscal 
policy reduces inequality also helped determine whether the prevailing inequality could be 
one of the reasons behind the slow economic growth and low impact on poverty reduction. 
Sub- Saharan African countries have also been characterised with low human development; 
UNDP (2015) indicates that Swaziland is ranked 148 out of 188 countries in terms of the 
Human Development Index (HDI); the country’s HDI was 0.541 in 2015, this index places 
the Swaziland among the low human development countries, the index is however above the 
Sub-Saharan countries average of 0.523. 
 
Dabla-Noris etal, (2015) refer to the following as some of the side effects of inequality in an 
economy: 
a. Negative impact on social development for the low income households as it can 
deprive them from accessing good quality healthcare and education facilities, 
therefore denying them the ability to accumulate human and physical capital 






b. It lowers the rate of poverty reduction and where economies are exposed to 
economic shocks with a negative impact on economic growth, a greater proportion 
of the population becomes vulnerable to poverty; and 
c. It destroys trust and social cohesion among citizens and this usually leads to conflict 
which in turn discourages investment towards infrastructural development. 
The above literature confirms that while it is important to pursue policies and strategies 
directed towards economic growth and the reduction of poverty, developing a fiscal policy 
that reduces inequality is also vital to attaining poverty reduction and inclusive economic 
growth, whose benefits are enjoyed across the population.  
 
Previous studies focused mainly on the country’s poverty levels and the amount of funding 
that government allocates to spending on public policies that have an impact on poverty 
reduction. There is a lack of studies on Swaziland determining whether the government’s 
fiscal policy is designed in a manner that promotes the redistribution of income and resources 
across the population hence the need to carry out this study. The previous inequality measure 
that was determined was based on the Swaziland Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
for 2000/2001. Based on this survey the Gini coefficient determined using 
consumption/household expenditure as a welfare measure was 0.51 (CSO 2001). In order to 
contribute to the work that has already been done regarding inequality and poverty in 
Swaziland, this study determined the country’s progress in reducing its income inequality in 
2010 by using the 2010 Household and Expenditure Survey. In addition, the study assessed 
the extent to which the government of Swaziland was using its fiscal policy to improve the 
level of inequality in the country. For the purposes of this study, the income recorded by 
households in the 2010 household survey was assumed to represent income earned from 
employment as the survey did not require households to reflect their sources of income.   
1.4 Research Question and Scope 
1.4.1 Research Question 
To what extent has the government of Swaziland realised the redistribution of resources 
through its tax and public expenditure policies? 
1.4.2 Scope of Research 
Swaziland’s main sources of tax revenue includes personal income tax, which is levied on 
employment income, the general sales tax (GST) which is levied on consumption of goods 






(SACU). According to the Swaziland Revenue Authority Annual Report (2012), in the 
2009/10 fiscal year the SACU receipts were equivalent to 20.03 per cent of the country’s 
GDP, personal income tax was equivalent to 5.13 per cent and sales tax equivalent to 3.85 per 
cent. In view of the fact that the latest national household survey was conducted in the 
2009/10 financial year, this study mapped the results of this household survey with the 
government budget for the same financial year and examined the extent to which country’s 
personal income tax, the graded tax, fuel levy and the excise taxes were progressive and had a 
redistributive effect. “Education and health improve human welfare directly; therefore, 
making these services broadly available should be a key objective of a country’s development 
strategy” (Etoh-anzah & Tafah, 2009:2). In order to improve the welfare of the nation, 
Swaziland has also incorporated the wide provision of education and health care services into 
its key fiscal objectives, hence, the study will focus on the extent to which the government’s 
public expenditure which is directed towards education and health services redistributes 
resources thus improving the welfare of its citizens.  
 
The provision of health and education services by the government is usually financed through 
the taxes that the government collects from various sources. However; governments also 
charge fees to the users of these services and the revenue raised from the user charges is used 
to supplement the funds that government directs towards the provision of such services. 
Demery (2000) maintains that, in order for households to benefit from the government 
subsidies in respect of the provision of education and health facilities, the households must 
use these facilities; however, they may have to incur out-of-pocket expenses in order to gain 
access to the facilities despite the fact that the services are state funded.  The study also 
assessed the incidence of out-of-pocket expenses incurred by households and how this 
affected their ability to access these services and, therefore benefit from government spending 
on health and education facilities. 
1.5 Research Assumptions 
Data relating to household income was obtained from the Swaziland’s Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey carried out in 2009/10 by Swaziland’s Central Statistics Office. In order 
to impute the amount of tax incurred by households, data relating to tax rates on income and 
consumption was obtained from the Swaziland Revenue Authority, while the data relating to 
the public expenditure programmes was obtained from the national budget estimates together 
with the actual budget prepared by the Ministry of Finance. In view of the general concerns 






purposes of this study that the data that was collected from the sources mentioned is of a 
generally acceptable standard. A tax incidence analysis generally seeks to determine who 
bears the burden of a tax levy, the progressivity of the tax and the redistributive capacity of 
the tax, while a benefit incidence analysis seeks to determine who benefits from public 
expenditure and whether such public expenditure is targeted at the people who are most in 
need of it. In view of the fact that the household survey did not include data on the taxes paid 
by households and the transfer benefits they received the following assumptions were made 
for the purposes of this research study. 
a. Household income represents the income earned from employment as the survey did 
not require households to reflect their sources of income.  
b. Income tax is borne by salary or wage earners as it is levied directly on their 
employment income and, it reduces disposable income; 
c.  Indirect taxes (sales tax, fuel levy and excise tax) are borne by households through 
their consumption of goods and services. It was assumed that the expenditure reported 
in the survey is inclusive of indirect taxes. 
d. Households also bear the cost of the fuel levy through the use of transport services 
and, thus, it was assumed that the cost of transport includes the fuel levy. 
e. The Swaziland Household and Expenditure Survey did not provide details of the 
nature of the education and health expenditure that households incurred. It was, 
therefore, assumed that the education and health expenditure reported in the survey 
related to the out-of-pocket expenses that the households incurred in order to gain 









CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction 
According to the International Monetary Fund (2014), every government should have in place 
a fiscal policy which accurately reflects the government’s decisions on how much to spend, 
which public expenditure programmes to spend on and whether to finance such spending 
through taxes or borrowing. The literature review analyses the tax and expenditure policies 
that national governments adopt in order to improve income distribution and realise the 
poverty alleviation goals. In addition, the review also examines the theories and empirical 
studies that support the adoption of these policies. The negative effects that the adoption of 
such policies may have on society are also discussed. 
2.2 Government Policy and Public Finance  
An important aspect of the theory and practice of public finance is related to 
conceptualizing and measuring how the revenue and expenditure sides of a 
government budget affect the distribution of income among households as the 
equitable distribution of income and improvement of the welfare of society is an 
important government goal (Martinez-Vazquez, 2004:1).  
Taxes represent revenue to government but they also constitute a burden on society as they 
reduce the taxpayers’ real disposable income. This means that it is incumbent on government 
to have a policy in place that can alleviate this burden, especially for low-income earners, in 
order to ensure that they are able to meet their basic needs.  
2.3 Tax Policy and Incidence 
2.3.1 Tax Policy 
Although taxes are one of the main sources of revenue for the government, the International 
Monetary Fund (2014) indicates that the manner in which the tax policy is designed may also 
help in achieving redistributive goals although this depends on both the progressivity of 
income related taxes such as the personal income tax, capital income tax, wealth taxes and the 
design of the indirect taxes.  According to Bird and Zolt (2003), in order to ensure that a 
country is able to benefit from its tax policy, it is essential that the policy is designed in such a 
manner that it minimises the loss of revenue through tax evasion or tax avoidance while the 






2.3.2 Properties of a Good Tax 
According to Pirie (2013), Adam Smith’s maxims of taxation are widely accepted as the 
acceptable standards of a good tax despite the fact that they do not carry any force of law with 
regard to adherence to them. Pirie (2013) summarised these maxims as follows: 
a. Equity – a good tax should promote a fair or reasonable distribution of income. 
b. Economic efficiency – imposed taxes should have minimal distortions on the choices 
made by taxpayer. 
c. Administrative efficiency – the costs associated with the collection of taxes and 
ensuring compliance with the tax laws should be kept as low as possible. 
d. Flexibility – requires that a tax system should be able to adapt to changes in economic 
circumstances and facilitate stability and economic growth. 
These properties continue to influence tax policy designs. The realisation of redistributive 
goals is said to be made possible through the use of progressive taxes as a progressive tax 
design seeks to balance equity and efficiency properties by collecting a greater proportion of 
revenue from the rich relative to the poor while, at the same time, trying to minimise any 
distortionary effects (Duncan & Peter 2008). 
 
2.3.3 Optimal Tax 
Frank Ramsey pioneered the optimal tax theory in 1927; the premise for the theory was that 
the tax system should seek to maximize the social welfare function, (Mankiw etal. 2009).  
Steenekamp (2005) further describes optimal taxation as efforts to design a system that 
improves efficiency by minimizing the excess burden in order to achieve a more equitable 
distribution of income. In 1971, James Mirrlees made his contribution to the optimal tax 
theory literature but added the following as pertinent issues to consider when designing the 
optimal tax policy; heterogeneity amongst the tax payers which provides for differences in the 
tax payers’ ability to earn income, standard labour behavior as a response to taxation and 
budget constraints that the government may face, (Mankiw et al. 2009). Although Mirrlees’ 
optimal tax proposal has been criticized for being highly complex, Mankiw et al. (2009) have 
also stated that it has become a dominant approach for theorists as it formalized the trade-off 
between equality and efficiency as the government seeks to redistribute income and ease the 
tax burden on the low income earners by taxing those with a high ability to earn income at a 
higher rate than those with a low ability and also ensure that those with a high ability do not 
pretend to be of low ability and therefore make the tax system inefficient. According to Heady 






indicates that Mirrlees optimal income tax theory was concerned with having a marginal tax 
that varies with a change in income while Frank Ramsey’s optimal commodities tax theory 
was concerned with the levying of taxes on commodities in order to raise a given level of 
revenue with the least possible distortionary effect. 
 
The tax theories mentioned above have influenced various tax reforms whose main focus is 
the redistribution of resources and enhancement of the welfare of its citizens. Mirrlees’ theory 
has mainly influenced personal income tax design, as various governments have adopted 
personal income tax policies aimed at levying higher taxes on individuals with a higher ability 
to pay by introducing different tax rates for different income levels. Ramsey’s theory has 
influenced consumption taxes as governments generate indirect taxes by levying these taxes 
on the consumption of goods and services by individuals. In determining its tax base the 
government has to identify the people from whom it will eventually collect the taxes, Bird & 
Zolt (2003) indicate that a distinction has to be made between people who have to pay the tax 
and those who bear the economic incidence or burden of the tax.  Bird & Zolt (2003) further 
stated that, only people bear the tax burden as they are taxed in their roles as consumers, 
producers, or factor suppliers. An example that is usually given to justify why the incidence of 
tax lies on people is the burden of the corporate taxes; although the tax is levied on the 
corporation the burden may lie on the shareholders through a reduction in profits, employees 
through the payment of minimal wages or passed on to consumers through price increases 
(Felix & Hines, 2009). 
2.3.4 Tax Incidence 
The tax incidence theory has its foundations in the 19th century when Seligman (1892) 
described two important processes, namely, the tax shifting process and the tax incidence 
process; wherein tax shifting relates to the process whereby the person on whom the tax is 
imposed transfers the tax to another person who then bears the burden of paying the shifted 
tax. In his work Seligman (1892) recommended that an analysis of the tax shifting process 
should be used as an aid to determine the behaviour of society in respect of tax policies and 
also to assess the fairness of the tax system. Taxes reduce people’s disposable income and 
may lead people to change their consumption preferences by seeking goods that can be 
substituted for those that are heavily taxed. However, a progressive tax system helps to 
reallocate resources and reduce inequality by levying higher taxes on the wealthy and 
imposing minimal taxes on basic commodities. According to Bird & Zolt (2003), efforts to 






have been ineffective in developing countries. Bird & Zolt (2003) attribute this is to the 
ability of wealthier people to find ways of shifting some of their tax burden in order to limit 
their tax liability. The redistribution of resources and the reduction of income inequality may 
be realised through both the tax and the expenditure policies of a country and, hence, the need 
for the government to design tax and public expenditure policies that complement each other 
and are directed towards the social welfare of its people. 
2.4 Public Expenditure Policy and Incidence 
2.4.1 Public Expenditure Policy 
According to Gildenhuys (1988), the role of government is based on four principles, one of 
which is ensuring the welfare of its citizens that is the social welfare state. Lustig (2011) 
indicates that the main objectives of the welfare state are to support the minimum living 
standard through the reduction of poverty, social protection, and income smoothing and 
ensuring an equal distribution of resources. In order to achieve the welfare state objectives 
government relies on the public expenditure policies as they have generally been found to 
achieve a better redistribution of resources than taxes.  
 
An analysis of the tax incidence is important as taxes represent a source of finance for public 
expenditure programmes and, thus, a country’s tax policy may have a significant impact on 
the decisions made by the government to finance such programmes.  Martinez-Vazquez 
(2004) states that government expenditure policies are usually implemented to improve the 
government’s efficiency in enabling the equitable distribution of resources; through the public 
provision of certain goods and services that the private markets fail to provide optimally. 
Schwabish et al. (2004) state that public expenditure programmes that are found to have a 
redistributive impact are usually those that involve the provision or subsidisation of private 
goods or services by the government through cash and near cash transfers with the intention 
of having a direct, positive impact on the welfare of the people. According to Niehues (2010), 
social expenditure programmes are designed to redistribute resources and reduce income 
inequality although behavioural disincentive effects may sometimes offset their impact. 
Niehues (2010) states that, high levels of unemployment benefits may provide little incentive 
to seek employment and this may, in turn, contribute to another economic problem of 
persistent high unemployment levels.  
 
Despite the role of government expenditure in reducing inequality and promoting economic 






and Keefer (1997) indicate that trust within societies promotes a strong incentive amongst 
citizens to innovate and accumulate physical and human capital which in turn can yield higher 
returns therefore increasing the income per capita. Gärtner & Prado (2012) are also of the 
view that the level of trust is negatively correlated with inequality, such that low levels of 
trust are accompanied by high levels of inequality. According to Putnam (1995) as cited in 
Gould & Hijzen (2017) “trust is a key component that enables participants to act together 
more effectively to pursue shared objectives”. This view confirms the importance of social 
cohesion in promoting economic growth. Gould & Hijzen (2017) also indicate that in order to 
effectively implement public policy, trust in the government by the citizens is important as 
lack of trust reduces the credibility of public policy.  
 
While governments can use the fiscal policy to redistribute resources, reduce the level of 
inequality and promote economic growth, trust in the government and its policies is important 
as people tend to be more supportive of social policies when they trust the government 
(Gärtner & Prado 2012). 
 
2.4.2 Public Expenditure Incidence 
 
The public expenditure incidence is meant to determine who benefits from the government 
expenditure programmes that are intended to improve the wellbeing of its society. According 
to Martinez-Vazquez (2004), analysing the public expenditure incidence is directly concerned 
with public expenditure policies whose main goal is to improve the equitable distribution of 
resources. According to Niehues (2010), such programmes may be divided into social 
insurance benefits and social assistance benefits in terms of which social assistance benefits 
are meant either to sustain the livelihoods of low-income households or to help people who 
meet certain criteria such as disability or old age, while social insurance benefits are intended 
to enable an individual to maintain their income in the face of adverse risks such as the loss of 
employment or illness. Although social spending programmes are designed to improve the 
livelihoods of people and reduce inequality, they have also been criticised for having certain 
undesired consequences. In their paper, Beauiler & Caplan (2002) stated that welfare 
programmes sometimes harm the people they are intended to help and therefore recommend 
that the undesired behavioural consequences be taken into consideration when designing these 






a. Giving money to the poor through social welfare programmes tends to encourage 
people not to seek employment and acquire the skills that may help them to rise above 
poverty. 
b. Easy access to welfare programmes encourages thinking only about the present and 
not planning for the future as well as irresponsibility on the part of the recipients.  
 
Martinez-Vazquez (2004) has recommended the following two approaches that may be used 
to estimate the public expenditure incidence, namely, the benefit incidence approach, and the 
behavioural approach. The benefit incidence approach determines the amount by which a 
household’s income would have to be increased by if the household were to bear the full cost 
of services, while the behavioural approach uses econometric models to estimate the 
behavioural demands of publicly provided private goods in order to assess the people’s 
willingness to pay for these goods and services. These two approaches can be used to 
complement each other and may also be helpful in addressing Beaulier & Caplan's (2002) 
criticisms of social spending. 
2.4.3 Fiscal Incidence  
According to Lustig (2011), government’s main objectives include the promotion of an 
acceptable minimum standard of living for all, support of a minimum level of human capital 
accumulation and the reduction of inequality in society. Gupta et al. (1998) are of the opinion 
that the fiscal policy is the most direct tool that a government can use to redistribute 
resources, both in the long and the short term. Martinez-Vazquez (2004) further states that 
when assessing the distributive ability of a policy, governments should carry out a 
simultaneous assessment of both the tax and public expenditure policy, as the overall fiscal 
policy may be progressive as a result of a progressive public expenditure policy despite the 
tax policy being regressive. According to the World Bank (2014), a fiscal incidence analysis 
assesses how the tax policy and public spending policy redistribute income among people in 
different deciles. Etoh-anzah & Tafah (2014) further indicate that a fiscal incidence review 
shows the difference between the benefits received by a household through the consumption 
of publicly provided goods and the reduction in income or loss of consumption as a result of 







































Figure 1: Income Definition and Fiscal Incidence Analysis 
Source: Lustig (2011) 
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2.4.4 Fiscal Incidence Analysis 
Bastagli et al. (2012) observed that although the fiscal policies in advanced economies have 
made a significant contribution to the reduction of inequality, in developing economies the 
policies have done little to redistribute income due to the lack of sufficient resources with 
which to finance redistributive social spending programmes and an inability to raise sufficient 
revenues in the developing economies.  
 
According to Tanzi & Zee (2000), these challenges are caused by the narrow income tax base 
in developing economies, which is due to the fact that the majority of people are employed in 
informal establishments and are paid irregular wages which are paid in cash and usually not  
recorded; these issues limit government’s ability to raise revenues through income taxes and 
consumption taxes as these wages are spent at informal retailers. Bastagli et al. (2012) 
acknowledge the limited ability of developing economies to deploy fiscal policies that 
redistribute income and they recommend the following as some of the strategies that can be 
implemented to improve the ability of developing economies to use their fiscal policies to 
reduce inequality:  
a. Strengthening government’s capabilities to raise more revenue in order to increase 
spending on public expenditure programmes that redistribute resources. 
b. Broadening the tax base while not increasing tax rates, reducing tax exemptions, closing 
tax loopholes and improving tax compliance. 
c. Implementing targeted social expenditure programmes as opposed to general programmes 
such as universal price subsidies which are costly for government and which have proved 
to be inefficient. 
2.4.5 Fiscal Incidence and Inequality 
In the past centuries, inequality was viewed as necessary for economic growth; however, 
recent developments have shown that inequality hinders growth and does not promote human 
development hence, the need to reduce such inequality for ethical reasons and the 
unwarranted income disparities (Milanovic 2011).  
 
According to Martin & Förster (2012), research on inequality carried out in OECD countries 
over the past 30 years has revealed that despite the economic growth that has been observed 
both in the OECD countries and emerging economies, the level of inequality remains high  as 
the average income of the richest 10 per cent of the population is nine times that of the poor. 






economies; OECD (2011), found the following to be some of the main causes of inequality in 
all economies: 
a. Globalisation whereby the integration of OECD countries into the world’s economy 
and the rapid improvement in technology promoted economic growth but also brought 
greater rewards for highly skilled workers compared to low skilled workers. This led 
to a huge gap between the earnings of the highly skilled workers and the low skilled 
workers. 
b. Technological changes, as these changes have led to an increased demand for highly 
skilled workers. However, society has not been able to produce these workers in the 
numbers that they are required and this has led to a significant increase in their wages 
relative to the wages of their less skilled counterparts. 
Despite the fact that the above causes of inequality have affected both developed and 
developing economies, the UNCTAD (2012) indicated that the fiscal policies adopted in 
developing economies have not reduced inequality as these economies also lost tariff 
revenues as a result of trade liberalisation and globalisation. This loss of revenues meant that 
the governments were no longer in a position to finance some of their development 
expenditure and their social programmes. The UNCTAD (2012) also alluded to the fact that 
the inequality situation in developing economies was aggravated by the restriction of official 
development assistance to these countries and that this has led to the introduction of user fees 
to access public services. According to Ram (2014), assessing the impact of secular economic 
growth is important as it also contributes to the allocation of resources among citizens. 
 
According Milanovic (2011) relevant education helps reduce the inequality gap between 
skilled and unskilled labourers however widespread education has been difficult to achieve as 
it requires a relatively even income distribution. “Various studies in different countries have 
revealed that a government’s unwillingness or inability to provide basic education for its 
citizens is associated with poor economic outcomes and has a negative impact on the 
country’s ability to participate in modern economic activity which can promote economic 






2.4.6 Measuring Fiscal Incidence 
In their report, Etoh-anzah&Tafah (2009) indicate that a combined fiscal incidence 
measurement is important for determining the distributional ability of the public expenditure 
programmes, together with the tax policies developed in order to raise the revenue required to 
finance these programmes, as an increase in taxes with the aim of increasing public 
expenditure may result in the overall fiscal policy becoming regressive Sahn & Younger 
(1999), indicate that household surveys carried out in various developing African countries 
revealed that the levels of inequality in these countries remained high despite the economic 
growth that had been observed in these countries; and recommended the implementation of 
policies with a strong focus on human capital development together with tax and public 
expenditure reforms that enable adequate redistribution of resources.  
 
The other two important concepts that are inherent in the assessment of a fiscal incidence 
analysis include the progressivity and distributional impact of both the tax policies and the 
public expenditure programmes.  
The progressivity principle is based on vertical equity which requires that differences 
in people’s circumstances should be appropriately taken into consideration in the 
designing and implementation of a public policy, in terms of tax it is accepted that the 
tax burden should be distributed in terms of the ability to pay indicator including the 
provision of tax structures that exempt people of a certain income level from paying 
tax (Essama-Nssah 2008:10).  
Essama-Nssah (2008) further states that the redistributive impact is based on the ability of the 
public policy to restore the efficient allocation of resources when market failure leads to 
pareto-inefficient outcomes or leaves members of society with a living standard that is 
unacceptably low on the basis of prevailing norms.  
 
Redistribution through the tax policy is based on the vertical equity principle and is 
considered to be redistributive if it eases the tax burden on low-income households. With 
regard to public expenditure policies, redistribution lies in the ability of such policies to meet 
the needs of low-income households by ensuring that the public expenditure programmes are 
easily accessible to these households and by also improving their standard of living. The 
redistributive impact is usually measured in terms of the Reynolds-Smolensky indices 






expenditure policy is useful in determining the extent to which these policies redistribute 
resources and improve the well-being of society.  
2.5  Progressivity and Distributive Impact 
2.5.1  Tax Progressivity and Distributive ability 
According to Martinez-Vazquez (2004), progressivity is a key concept in a fiscal incidence 
analysis as it is generally believed that a progressive tax structure reduces inequality. Taxes 
that are levied on income have an impact on the disposable income of households, hence, a 
progressive tax structure is expected to collect more taxes from the rich than the poor, thus 
minimising the reduction of the disposable income of the poor (Nutter et al. 2014).  However, 
Duncan & Peter (2008) observe that the efforts of governments to raise more revenue from 
the rich through progressive taxes have been counteracted by behavioural responses on the 
part of the rich as they have been found to be more responsive to changes in taxes and devise 
means to hide their income.  
 
Although governments have to make a trade-off between efficiency and equity, tax 
progressivity continues to be used as a fiscal incidence measure. Although an income 
redistribution objective is inherent in a country’s tax policy, Prasad (2008) recommends that, 
when using the tax instrument for redistribution purposes, the way in which people are likely 
to behave should be taken into consideration in order to minimise distortions in the labour 
market and/or people’s incentive to work, invest and create wealth. Prasad (2008) further 
recommends combining different taxes to promote the overall progressivity of the tax system 
because various taxes have different impacts on the redistribution of resources. According to 
the UNCTAD (2012), most developed and developing economies raise a significant 
proportion of their overall revenue from income taxes, however progressive tax structures 
contain several exemptions and allowances that lead to the loss of revenue that is required by 
governments to finance public expenditure. The redistributive effect of a tax policy depends 
on the extent to which the tax burden may be shifted; shifting of the tax burden also depends 
on the alternatives available to the parties in a taxed transaction, this effectively means that 
one party is less likely to bear the tax burden when the party has other alternatives to what is 
being taxed (Essama-Nssah 2008). Thus, the distribution of resources through the tax policy 







Steinmo & Bird (2003) conducted a review of the tax reforms in OECD countries and 
observed that the reforms that had been undertaken had led to the overall tax systems 
becoming regressive as a result of the reduction in income and capital taxes and the increases 
in consumption taxes, which had led to a shift in the tax burden from the rich households to 
the poor households. Tax reforms in many developed economies have, in general, benefited 
high income households while the continuous increases in consumption taxes have led to the 
tax systems becoming less progressive or even regressive; this has also contributed to slow 
economic growth and high unemployment levels, (UNCTAD 2012). A study by Chu et al. 
(2000) found that, on the whole, developed economies have managed to achieve redistribution 
of resources through both the tax system and social transfer policies but in developing 
countries, redistribution through taxes was found to be negligible as the tax systems were 
made up primarily of consumption taxes which are often regressive. 
 
2.5.2 Public Expenditure Progressivity and Redistributive Ability 
Public expenditure refers to the transfer of funds from the government to the people and it 
may be expected to increase the disposable income of the citizens or provide public services 
to minimise the burden on consumers, Obst (2013). According to Prasad (2008), the 
redistribution of resources may be effected through social transfer programmes and social 
insurance programmes. Prasad (2008) further stated that social transfer programmes are 
considered to be the more progressive and redistributive as they are directly targeted at the 
poor, while social insurance programmes have been found to be regressive, especially in the 
developing economies, as they exclude people in the informal sector and contributions to such 
schemes tend to reduce current disposable income.  
 
There is strong support for the subsidisation of primary education; as it is believed to be more 
progressive because there is a notion that the ability to read and write is critical for sustaining 
people’s welfare and has a positive effect on economic growth (Castro-Leal et al. 1999). On 
the other hand, higher level education subsidies have been found to be less progressive than 
primary education subsidies, but the subsidies are justified on the basis of the perceived 
external effects of human capital accumulation (Prasad 2008). Adeolu (2010) indicated that 
studies that have been carried out in various economies revealed that the progressivity of 
public expenditure programmes is dependent on the accessibility of these programmes to the 






public expenditure programme may also be assessed on the extent to which the programme 
reaches the targeted people and, hence, the concepts of targeting and progressivity are 
commonly used in a benefit incidence analysis (Van der Berg & Moses 2009). According to 
Chu et al. (2000), government spending is considered to be well targeted if the share of the 
benefits directed to the poorer households is larger than the share of benefits spent on the 
richer households.  
 
Although funding for education and health programmes is continuing to increase, the extent 
of the progressivity of such funding differs in various countries. In their study, Chu et al. 
(2000) reviewed the redistributive impact of tax and public expenditure policies in various 
countries during the 1990s. They observed that  education spending was progressive in 55 of 
the countries that they surveyed although poor targeting was observed in sub-Saharan Africa, 
the Middle-East and transition economies, while the Asian programmes were observed to be 
the most progressive as they were well targeted. Chu et al. (2000) also observed that primary 
education expenditure was the most progressive, followed by secondary education 
expenditure, tertiary education spending was, however, the least progressive in all the regions. 
The study also observed that in sub-Saharan Africa the poorest quintile received 4.5 per cent 
of the tertiary education spending while the richest quintile received 59 per cent of the 
spending. Cubero & Vladkova (2010) reviewed the redistributive impact of the tax and public 
expenditure policies in Central American countries between 1995 and 2003. They observed 
that primary education funding was the most progressive, while secondary education funding 
followed an inverted U-shaped trend and tertiary education funding was regressive. 
 
Chu et al. (2000) also surveyed the benefit incidence of government health spending in 38 
countries; health spending was found to be generally progressive in all the countries but was 
well targeted in 21 countries only, Sub-Saharan Africa’s health spending was poorly targeted, 
whereas in the Asian and Latin American countries the poorest quintile received between one 
and a half and three times more than the richest quintiles. Cubero & Vladkova (2010) 
observed that in the Central American countries, 70 per cent of government spending was 
directed at health spending on the three bottom quintiles, with 25 per cent of this being 
directed at the poorest quintile.  
 
Van de Berg (2009) reviewed the fiscal incidence of social spending in South Africa. He 






very well targeted with regard to primary and secondary education and tertiary education 
spending was regressive, health spending was also well targeted and benefited the poor. Van 
de Berg (2009) attributes the increased health spending to the fact that affluent people tend to 
opt out of the public health system for a variety reasons including poor quality services and 
this therefore allows the poor to receive a larger share of the subsidised health benefits than 
may otherwise have been the case. The budget allocations to the various levels of service, that 
is, hospital and non-hospital care and the rate of usage of these facilities by poor households, 
play an important role in understanding why health spending may be poorly targeted. Castro-
Leal et al (1999) observed that in nine African countries there was a high allocation of the 
health care budget to hospital-based services than primary health care which is mostly used by 
the poor. 
2.5.3 Financing of Public Expenditure 
In order for government to incur public expenditure on health and education facilities and 
other facilities, government must have sufficient funding at its disposal to provide for these 
facilities. Although taxes are the major source of government revenue, government also 
charges user fees that are then used to fund the provision of these services. There has been 
much discussion on the impact of these user fees on inequality and the extent to which the 
user fees may create a barrier to the poorer households accessing the state facilities and, 
therefore, benefiting from the government spending on such facilities. According to Bird & 
Zolt (2003), a scarcity of financial resources makes it difficult for governments to provide 
public services efficiently hence, the need to charge user fees to help improve the efficiency 
with which government may provide public services. In assessing the burden of health and 
education financing on households, it is important to compare the amount that households 
incur in accessing these services with their ability to pay for such services, (O’Donnell et al. 
2008). The payment of the user fees is deemed to be progressive if the richer households 
contribute a higher proportion of their income than the poor households, regressive if the poor 
pay a higher proportion of their income than the richer households and proportional if 
everyone contributes the same proportion of their income to the financing of the services 
(Mtei & Borghi 2012). According to Lustig (2011), the co-payments/user fees incurred by 
households to access public facilities affect the households’ final income as these fees must be 







a. Education Out-of-Pocket Expenses/User Fees 
Governments generally take a leading role in the provision of education because of the strong, 
positive social effects of education on the reduction of inequality and poverty. In their report, 
OXFAM (2014) highlighted the importance of the universal provision of public services like 
education and health and the positive impact that this has on the fight against inequality.  
According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2014), at the time when 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were developed, education conditions in Africa 
were among the worst in the world, both in terms of structure and quality. The United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (2014) states that it is these adverse conditions that 
contributed to the development of MDG 2 which relates to the achievement of universal 
education for all. Several progress reports monitoring the achievement of the MDGs by 
member states have shown that the greatest challenge in achieving MDG 2 has been the high 
level of drop-outs or non-attendance by children from low income households as a result of 
their inability to pay either school fees or the other out-of-pocket expenses associated with 
sending children to school. 
 
Tiongson (2010) carried out a study on the distributional impact of various education reforms 
in different countries. He reviewed both the expenditure reforms relating to governments’ 
decisions to restructure their education spending by reallocating more funds to primary 
education than to higher education and the financing reforms which examined the impact of 
the removal of user fees on enrolment rates and the quality of education provided. Tiongson 
(2010) observed that in several countries, such as Botswana, Malawi, Uganda, and Kenya, the 
removal of user fees had led to an improvement in enrolment rates especially among the poor 
households; however, the quality of education had deteriorated as a result of the increase in 
the pupil–teacher ratio.  
 
According to Watt & Rowden (2002), if judged according to the ability-to-pay principle, the 
introduction of user fees restricts access to public services, limits the use of the public 
services by low-income households, and widens the inequality gap. Education user fees may 
be cited as the main reason for the non-completion of formal education by children from poor 
households in developing economies. However, Hillman & Jenkner (2004) indicate that the 
abolition of education user fees may not always be a solution, as in other cases user fees may 






other social improvements for the people receiving the education; such improvements may 
then encourage parents to send their children to school despite having to incur the necessary 
expenses. Kattan & Burnett (2004) state that in cases where user fees make a contribution to 
the quality of education and the upkeep of facilities, their abolition may have undesired 
consequences. They recommend that when deciding to abolish user fees, governments should 
increase spending on education in order to replace the loss of revenue from user fees in order 
to also prevent the deterioration in the quality of education.  
 
b. Health Out of Pocket Expenses/User Fees 
According to Ataguba & Akazili (2010), health care financing is currently receiving 
significant attention at the policy level in both developing and developed economies. It would 
appear that the major issue is how governments can raise sufficient resources to finance the 
health care needs of their citizens. The equitable financing of health care is in line with the 
achievement of universal health care coverage. According to the World Health Organisation 
(2010), governments need to ensure that their health care financing systems allow for people 
to access all types of health services without incurring financial hardships.  
 
Health care financing can also help redistribute resources. This redistribution may either be 
vertical or horizontal, where vertical redistribution occurs when health contributions are 
unequally related to the ability to pay and horizontal redistribution occurs when people with 
the same ability to pay do not make equal contributions or payments towards healthcare 
(O’Donnell et al. 2008).  In order to implement a health financing system that is capable of 
redistributing resources efficiently, governments have to identify the sources of finance that 
they have at their disposal. Macha et al. (2012) identified the following as sources of health 
finance for the governments in Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa, namely, general taxes, out-
of-pocket payments (user fees) and health insurance. However, they observed that out-of-
pocket expenses were regressive in all these countries; taxes were progressive, while health 
insurance contributions were progressive for the formal sectors in all the countries but 
regressive for the informal sectors in all the countries. Evans (2012) recommends that in order 
to achieve the equitable distribution of health care financing while maintaining financial risk 
protection, there should be a reduction of out-of-pocket payments at the point of service and 
an increase in the compulsory prepayment of health expenses through insurance or taxes. 
Evans (2012) further recommends that the poor people who are not able to afford the 







The universal health coverage principle advocates that governments implement progressive 
health financing systems that allow for the richest households to contribute a higher 
proportion of their income to health care financing compared to poor households (World 
Health Organisation 2010).  In other words, when households have been grouped according to 
welfare measure either income or expenditure the proportion of health financing contributions 
to the welfare measure should increase when moving from the poorest decile (quintile) to the 
richest decile. According to O’Donnell et al. (2008), analysing the progressivity of health care 
payments is intended to determine the distribution of the economic burden of health care 
financing on households.  
 
The World Health Organisation (2010) advocates for a health finance system that allows for 
the sharing of costs in order to minimise the financial risks associated with health financing. 
The World Health Organisation (2010) further recommends the pooling of resources/health 
insurance financing in terms of which the cost of health care is borne by all the members of 
the pool with contributions to the pool being made periodically prior to illness occurring. 
O’Donnell et al. (2008) also state that a wider redistribution through healthcare financing may 
also be achieved if the payments towards healthcare financing are compulsory and do not 
depend on usage as voluntary contributions do not redistribute resources as a result of the fact 
that people pay for the services as and when they need to use them. Although out-of-pocket 
expenses may be regressive and discourage the use of health services by the poor households, 
Macha et al. (2012) observed that the health insurance schemes may also be regressive if they 
are not designed in a manner that renders them affordable to the poor households; In Ghana 
and Tanzania the health care insurance premiums were found to be regressive for the informal 
sector but were still preferred by most to out-of-pocket expenses while, in South Africa, 
health insurance was provided by the private sector and was, therefore, mainly accessible to 
the well off in society.  
 
A progressive health care financing system is important if countries are to achieve universal 
health coverage. This may, however, be difficult for developing economies to achieve due to 
the limited resources at the disposal of the governments in these economies. Stuckler et al. 
(2010) are of the opinion that both the low GDP and the poverty in developing economies 
may be a barrier to the implementation of progressive health care financing and the 






observations by indicating that political commitment through a legal mandate and democratic 
structures contributes to an increase in the allocation of resources for health financing either 
through taxes or subsidies or by exempting poor households from the payment of user fees or 
health insurance premiums. Macha et al. (2012) also observed that the quality of the health 
services offered in public health facilities and the ease of access to such facilities have a 
significant impact on the willingness of the people to finance the provision of these services 
either through membership of a health insurance scheme or out-of-pocket expenses. Regular 
drug shortages, a lack of functional equipment and the distances that people have to travel to 
access the health facilities also have an impact on the people’s willingness to finance the 
health services (Macha et al. 2012).  
 
Usage of public health facilities by households is also affected by the households’ ability to 
pay for these services either through user fees or health insurance contributions. A regressive 
health financing system may, therefore, limit the use of public health facilities by the poor 
households and this will result in the health facilities being used primarily by the richer 
households and thus the public health subsidy will benefit the rich households more than the 
poor. 
2.6 Conclusion  
The literature showed that although a country’s tax policy may be designed to enable the 
government to collect the revenue required to finance public expenditure, it may also be 
designed in a manner that enables the government to redistribute resources from the rich to 
the poor. A tax policy that allows for the redistribution of resources is said to be progressive. 
Inherent in a progressive tax is the equity and efficiency properties of a good tax; as such a 
tax promotes a fair distribution of income while also effecting minimal distortions of the 
taxpayers’ choices.  
 
The literature review further indicated that wider redistribution may be achieved through a 
redistributive tax policy combined with a redistributive public expenditure policy, where a 
public expenditure policy is considered to be progressive if the poorer households receive a 
higher benefit compared to that received by the rich households. Progressive tax policies have 








The literature also indicated that for a government to assess the effectiveness of its fiscal 
policy, that is, the tax and public expenditure policy, it is important that each policy is not 
analysed in isolation from the other as a decision to increase public expenditure requires the 
government to assess whether it has sufficient financial resources to support such an increase. 
If the tax and public expenditure policies are considered in isolation the government runs the 
risk of increasing the tax burden in order to finance public expenditure and this may in turn 
lead to a regressive fiscal policy. On the other hand if the government decides to reduce the 
tax rates to ease the burden on the low income households, it runs the risk of not having 
sufficient resources with which to finance public expenditure and this may in turn have 
adverse consequences for poor households.  
 
There has been increased support worldwide for governments to improve their expenditure on 
health and education spending as investment in the citizens’ education and health has been 
found to have a direct positive impact on human development. The call for an increase in 
expenditure on health and education is also supported by MDG 2 and the goal to achieve 
universal health coverage. It emerged from the literature review that achieving universal 
health coverage is underpinned by the need to ensure that there is an equitable financing of 
health care facilities and services such that even the poor households may access the public 
health services without incurring financial hardship. MDG 2 advocates the provision of free 
primary education to enable poor households to have access to primary education facilities. 
The provision of free primary education and universal health coverage is also intended to ease 
the burden of financing the provision of these services through the payment of user fees by 
households.  
 
The literature review also indicated that through its fiscal policy, a government may enhance 
the well-being of its society. However, this may be difficult in cases where the government 
has limited revenue-generating resources and depends primarily on tax as a source of revenue. 
This is normally the situation in most developing economies where governments’ efforts to 
increase public expenditure are limited by the narrow tax base. This narrow tax base is the 
result of the fact that most people are employed in the informal sector and do not pay tax, 
while most of their spending is also in the informal sector where government does not collect 
any taxes. This also indicates that a government’s ability to redistribute resources through its 
fiscal policy is, to a large extent, dependant on the government’s capacity to generate 






Limitations in the government’s revenue-generating resources mean that the government will 
be forced to restructure its expenditure side of the budget and direct more resources to the 








CHAPTER 3     RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
In determining the impact of tax policies and public expenditure programmes on improving 
the wellbeing of society, it is essential to determine the progressivity and redistributive effect 
of these policies and programmes. A tax policy is considered to be progressive if it provides 
for the collection of more revenues from the rich people than from the lower income or poor 
people (Nutter et al. 2014), while a public expenditure policy is deemed to be progressive if 
the share of benefits received by the low-income households is higher than the share received 
by the high-income households (Adeolu & Von Humbolt 2005). The redistributive effect of a 
tax policy tends to be limited by the excess burdens or efficiency losses associated with a 
highly progressive policy, while the redistributive effect of a public expenditure policy 
depends on how well targeted the public expenditure programmes are (Martinez-Vazquez 
2004).  
3.1 Swaziland’s Fiscal Policy Toolkit 
A tax incidence analysis reviews the impact of both the direct and indirect taxes on society 
and in order to determine the fairness of the entire tax system it is important to consider the 
economic incidence of taxation (Bird & Zolt 2003). The government of Swaziland derives 
over two-thirds of its revenue from its tax system. The Swaziland Revenue Authority (2010) 
reported that during the 2009/10 financial year, 57.32 per cent of the tax revenue was 
generated from the customs and excise duties through the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) income transfers, 21 per cent from corporate taxes, 14.68 per cent from the personal 
income tax deducted from salaries or wages, while 11.01 per cent was generated from the 
sales tax. However, the 2014/15 financial year budget revealed that customs and excise duties 
through the SACU receipts had declined to 50.9 per cent of the tax revenue while revenue 
from corporate taxes had declined to 7.12 per cent; personal income tax revenue had also 
declined to 12.6 per cent and value-added-tax revenue to 12.1 per cent. The tax incidence 
analysis, therefore, focused on these taxes and other taxes that could be imputed to 
households such as the fuel levy. 
 
The government of Swaziland is also committed to human capital development through its 
public expenditure which is directed at improving the welfare of the people. The 
government’s human development goals were articulated in the National Development 
Strategy Paper, which was launched in 1997, and are intended to guide the government in 






government continues to take these goals into consideration every year and, in the 2009/2010 
financial year, health and education expenditure made up 21.2 per cent of the public 
expenditure, in the 2011/2012 financial year it had been increased to 24.2 per cent and in the 
2014/2015 financial year the expenditure had increased to 25.7 per cent of the public 
expenditure. 
 
According to Etoh-anzah & Tafah (2014), public expenditures generate the transfer of 
resources to society; health and education expenditure programmes have been proven to have  
long-term positive effects on human capital development and poverty reduction. Demery 
(2000) also shares similar views and highlights the following as important reasons for 
assessing the government’s ability to redistribute resources through health and education 
spending: 
a. Health and education are important services for lifting people out of poverty, 
improving the health status of the poor and providing the poor with the relevant 
knowledge and skills makes a significant contribution to alleviating poverty. 
b. Both services yield important external benefits, especially at the primary level. 
c. Governments devote a significant proportion of their budgets to the provision of health 
and education. 
3.2 Data Collection, Frequency and Choice of Data   
The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which the government of Swaziland 
has been able to redistribute resources and minimise the inequality gap through its tax and 
public expenditure policies. The study used secondary data from the Swaziland Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey of 2010 (SHIES) data from the National Budget and data 
from the Swaziland Revenue Authority. In The Commitment to Equity Assessment Handbook, 
Lustig (2011) indicated that the absence of data on the payment of taxes and transfer benefits 
from the household surveys requires that a detailed description of how each component used 
in the incidence analysis was determined be done. The handbook recommends adopting a 
method based on a country’s institutional structures and the available data. Lustig & Higgins 
(2013) recommend several methods that may be used for allocating taxes and transfers, one 
such method is the imputation method; this method uses data from the household survey 
together with information from the public accounts and statutory provisions. The imputation 







Data relating to the tax policy and applicable tax rates was collected from the Swaziland 
Revenue Authority, while data relating to the public expenditure programmes was obtained 
from the 2009/2010 budget speech and the budget estimate book for a detailed breakdown of 
the budget items. In order to analyse the impact of both direct and indirect taxes, data relating 
to the income and expenditure of households was obtained from the SHIES Survey of 2010. 
The SHIES survey does not, however, collect data on the taxes that households pay. 
Accordingly, it was necessary to impute the statutory rates that are prescribed in the different 
legislations to the households’ income for the purposes of direct taxes while, for the purposes 
of the indirect taxes, the statutory rates were also imputed to the expenditure items reflected in 
the survey. 
 
According to Martinez-Vazquez (2004), in order to estimate benefit incidence or public 
expenditure incidence, it is necessary to combine data on the use of the public services by 
households which is usually contained in the household surveys with the data on the cost of 
providing these services. Demery (2000) indicates that the rationale behind the use of 
estimates in a benefit incidence analysis and not the subsidised cost that consumers pay is due 
to the fact that the supply of such subsidised goods is usually rationed and it is, therefore, not 
valid to use the price paid as a measure of the underlying value of the goods to the individual 
consumer. Thus, in taking the above views of Martinez-Vazquez (2004) and Demery (2000) 
into consideration, data required for assessing the public expenditure incidence was obtained 
from the 2009/2010 fiscal budget to determine the funding allocated to these public 
expenditure programmes while the data on the use of health and education services by 
households was obtained from the Annual Education Census Report for 2010, as prepared by 
the Ministry of Education, and the Swaziland Annual Health Statistics Report for 2010, as 
prepared by the Ministry of Health. This data was used for estimating the health and 
education unit subsidies which were applied to the data obtained from the SHIES survey to 
determine the incidence of these expenditures. 
3.3 Data Analysis Methods  
3.3.1 Tax and Expenditure Incidence 
The majority of the fiscal incidence studies that have been carried out in various countries 
identified the following useful data analysis methods as relevant for determining the incidence 
of tax and public expenditure and the net effect of both. Sahn & Younger (1999), Demery 






following as relevant data analysis methods in determining the fiscal incidence of a country’s 
tax and expenditure policies:  
a. Concentration Curves and Indices 
According to Etoh-anzah & Tafah (2009:3):  
The concentration curve is a normative tool used in assessing the impact of tax and 
transfer policies and reforms, the curve is similar to the Lorenz curves as it plots 
households from the poorest to the wealthiest on the horizontal axis against the 
cumulative proportion of benefits received or taxes paid for all households. 
 
Kakwani (1977) extended the Lorenz curve concept and used it to analyse the relationships 
relating to the distributions of different economic variables. Kakwani (1977) defined the 
generalised Lorenz curve as the concentration curve. Van der Berg & Moses (2012) further 
indicated that the concentration curve, unlike the Lorenz curve, may lie above the diagonal 
line of perfect equality, which would indicate that public spending is progressive and pro-
poor; however, if the concentration curve lies below the diagonal line this is an indication of a 
regressive public spending policy. In the case of the tax concentration curve, Etoh-anzah & 
Tafah (2009) indicate that if the curve lies below the diagonal line, the tax policy is 
progressive and equity enhancing whereas, if the concentration curve lies above the diagonal, 
the tax is regressive. Cubero & Hollar (2010) further state that the concentration curve 
measures the cumulative tax paid per quintile of pre-tax income and a tax is considered 
progressive if its concentration curve consistently lies below the Lorenz curve. Based on the 
concentration curves concept, Van der Berg (2005) defined the concentration index as 
1-2* (Area under the concentration curve) 
where the concentration curve for a pro-poor public spending policy lies above the diagonal 
and has a negative concentration index and a public spending policy that is not pro-poor 
would have a positive concentration index.  Cubero & Hollar (2010), however, indicate that in 
a situation in which it is not possible to determine the overall progressivity because the 
concentration curve crosses the pre-tax Lorenz curve several times, then the Gini coefficient 
for the tax concentration curve, that is, the quasi-Gini coefficient, may be used to determine 










b. Kakwani Index 
According to Haughton & Khandker (2009), generating a summary measure of the 
progressivity of a tax is also helpful and one common approach to this is the Kakwani 
measure of tax progressivity or the Kakwani index. The Kakwani index is calculated by 
deducting the tax or public expenditure concentration index from the pre-tax Gini coefficient. 
A positive Kakwani index reflects a progressive tax policy, a negative Kakwani index reflects 
a regressive tax policy and an index of zero reflects a neutral tax policy (World Bank 2014). 
With regard to public expenditure a positive Kakwani index indicates that the public 
expenditure policy is not progressive while a negative index indicates that the expenditure 
policy is both equity enhancing and progressive (Van de Berg 2005).  
 
Creedy et al. (2008) describe the Kakwani index according to the formula below and indicate 
that the index measures the disproportionality of the tax payments relative to pre-tax incomes:  
K = Ci – Gy 
 where Ci is the concentration index and 
Gy is the Gini index before any fiscal intervention. 
The Kakwani index measure was also used in this research to assess the redistributive effect 
of Swaziland’s tax and public expenditure policies. 
 
c. Reynold-Smolensky Index 
Haughton & Khandker (2009) indicate that the Kakwani index is a good measure of 
progressivity of the tax or expenditure policy but that it does not serve as a good indicator of 
the impact that a change in the tax or expenditure policy would have on the distribution of 
income or the reduction of poverty. They recommend the use of the Reynold-Smolensky 
measurement for this purpose. Creedy et al. (2008) describe the Reynold-Smolensky index 
according to the formula below: 
RS2 = Gy – Gz  
where GY is the Gini coefficient for pre-tax/benefit income and  
Gz is the Gini coefficient post-tax/benefit income. 
A positive index indicates that a tax is progressive while a negative index would be indicative 
of a regressive tax. Like the Kakwani index, a positive index indicates that the public 
spending is regressive and not equity enhancing while a negative index shows that the policy 







d. Benefit Incidence Analysis 
“The benefit incidence methodology was pioneered by Meerman (1979) and Selowsky 
(1979), the methodology combines the cost of providing public services with information on 
their use to show how the benefits of government spending are distributed across the 
population” (Etoh-anzah, Tabi & Jumbo 2004:8). Demery (2000) describes the following as 
the relevant steps in the benefit incidence methodology: 
i. Obtaining estimates on the unit subsidy of providing a particular service – usually 
obtained from the official public spending in question 
ii. Imputing the unit subsidy to households or individuals that have been identified 
as the users of the service, and 
iii. Aggregate individuals or households and categorise them into quintiles or deciles 
sub-groups of the population in order to compare how the subsidy is distributed 
across such groups – the most commonly used grouping being the household 
income or expenditure. 
According to Sahn & Younger (2000), the aggregation of individuals or households into sub-
groups allows for the cumulative ranking of the population from the poorest to the richest in 
terms of either income or expenditure and, therefore, shows the distribution of the public 
expenditure across the population. Van de Berg (2009) indicates that the public expenditure 
policy is considered to be progressive if a larger proportion of the spending benefits the 
poorer households compared to the rich households and regressive if the richer households 
receive more than the poor households. Demery (2003) indicates that the benefit incidence 
analysis imputes to those households using a particular service the cost of providing that 
service while the imputation relates to the amount by which household income would have to 
increase if it had to pay for the service used. Demery (2003) recommends the use of the 

















    
Where xj is the total education spending imputed to group j 
 S is the government education subsidy 
Eij is the number indicating public school enrolment with the subscript (i) representing 
the level of education, that is, primary, secondary and tertiary 
eij is the shares of the group in total service use which is a reflection of household 
behaviour (enrolment in the case of education and use of health facilities in the case of 






Si is the shares of public spending across the different types of service which is a 
reflection of government behaviour.  
 
3.3.2 Net Fiscal Incidence 
According to Cubero & Vladkova (2010), the results from the tax incidence and public 
expenditure incidence may be combined to produce an estimate of the distributional effects of 
the fiscal policy. This is done by comparing the concentration indices of income patterns 
before and after fiscal policy interventions and is summarised by the Reynold-Smolensky 
Index. Etoh-anzah, Tabi & Jumbo (2004) further indicate that the progressivity of the 
combined tax and public expenditure is assessed on the policy’s ability to reduce the pre-tax 
and pre-public expenditure Gini coefficient.  According to Jenkins (1988), the Gini measure 
post tax/expenditure may be expressed in terms of the following covariance: 
 2 cov ,Gx x F xx
       
Where: Gx is the pre-tax Gini measure 
 x is the pre-tax/public expenditure income  
 F(x) is the distribution function of household expenditure, so that that the F(x) 
represents the proportion of individuals with expenditure less than or equal to x 
x is the arithmetic mean of the pre-tax/transfer expenditure. 
Gy = Post-tax/expenditure Gini 
 2 cov ,F(y)y
Gy y
   
Where: Gy is the Gini measure 
y is the post-tax/public expenditure income  
F(y) is the distribution function of household expenditure, so that that the F(y) 
represents the proportion of individuals with expenditure less than or equal to y 
y is the arithmetic mean of the post-tax/transfer expenditure. 
 
Etoh-anzah & Tafah (2009) indicate that the redistributive effect of the combined tax and 
expenditure system is the difference between the pre-tax/expenditure Gini and the post-
tax/expenditure Gini as represented by L, which is also the Reynold-Smolensky measure of 
income distribution progressivity,  






Etoh-anzah & Tafah (2009), further state that a negative L indicates that the combined tax and 
expenditure system reduces inequality while a positive L indicates that the combined tax and 
expenditure system do not reduce inequality.  
3.3.3 Measuring the Net Fiscal Incidence for Swaziland 
The data analysis method adopted for the purposes of this research follows the fiscal 
incidence analysis measurements/methods discussed above. The tax policy incidence was 
based on taxes that could be directly imputed to the data collected by the SHIES. Applicable 
tax rates as per the revenue authority’s tax tables were applied to this data. In order to 
generate the distribution regarding the education and health spending, data relating to the cost 
incurred in providing these public services was obtained from the government budget while 
data regarding their use was also obtained from the household income and expenditure 
survey, the annual education census report and the 2010 Swaziland annual health statistics 
report. This step was deemed to be necessary as it allowed for the households to be grouped 
into deciles or quintiles in order to assess the distribution of the tax burden and public 
expenditure across the population. The SPSS software was then used to compute the Kakwani 
Index, the Reynold-Smolensky index and the concentration indices and for the graphical 
representation of the tax and benefit incidence measurements through the concentration 
curves. 
3.4  Research Limitations 
It was not possible to assess the incidence of the following taxes as the Swaziland Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey (SHIES) 2009/10, which was the main source of household 
data, did not contain any data on households’ encounter with these taxes: 
a. Company tax – this tax is charged on company profits. The SHIES did not contain 
any data on the ownership of corporate asset, which could result in households being 
affected by this tax. 
b. Road tolls tax – the tax was excluded as it is levied only on foreign registered 
vehicles at the country’s border posts and on all commercial vehicles. The SHIES did 
not contain any data on the ownership of commercial vehicles by households. 
c. Withholding tax – residents are affected by this tax only if they own interest-bearing 
instruments, for example unit trust investment and government treasury bills, or own 
property that they have leased out. Data on the ownership of these instruments and 







The following were the limitations for the benefit incidence analysis; 
a. Quality of health and education – the analysis does not take into account the quality 
of the health and education services that the government provided, as collecting data 







CHAPTER 4 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Through its National Development Strategy, the government of Swaziland undertakes to 
develop strategies directed at the socio-economic development and welfare enhancement of 
its people. Some of the most important goals articulated in this strategy include the 
eradication of poverty, the equitable distribution of resources and the improvement of human 
development.   
Since 1997 when the National Development Strategy was developed, the government has 
been struggling to achieve its socio-economic developmental goals. According to the Central 
Statistics Office (2001), in 2001 the percentage of people living in poverty was found to be 
fairly high at 69 per cent. However, in 2010 the Central Statistics Office (2010) observed that 
there had been a slight decline of 6 percentage points as the number of people living in 
poverty had declined to 63 per cent. The country has not made significant progress with 
regard to the achievement of its human development goals. According to the United Nations 
Development Programme (2015), in 2014 Swaziland was ranked 148 out of 188 countries 
with a HDI of 0.541. The household income data collected for the SHIES 2010 study also 
revealed that the income inequality level expressed according to the GINI coefficient was 
fairly high at 0.7909. 
 
Having reviewed the country’s National Development Strategy and the progress that the 
country has made in attaining the objectives outlined in this strategy, the incidence analysis 
carried out for the purposes of this research sought to determine whether the government’s 
fiscal policy is consistent with the goals reflected in the National Development Strategy. This 
was assessed in terms of the progressivity and redistributive ability of both the tax and the 






 4.1 Income Distribution 
“Extreme disparities in income are slowing the pace of poverty reduction and hampering the 
development of broad-based economic growth, disparities in basic life chances for health, 
education and participation in society are preventing millions of Africans from realising their 
potential” (Annan, 2012:6). The level of income inequality in Swaziland has also led to the 
slow pace of both poverty reduction and economic growth and development. The Swaziland 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey carried out in 2010 revealed that the two richest 
deciles account for 75.32 per cent of the total household income while the poorest deciles 
account for only 2.55 per cent of the total household income. Figure 2 below was prepared 
according to the data collected in the 2010 household survey. Households were grouped into 
deciles using income as a welfare measure. The results in Figure 2 show that, in 2010, there 
was an unequal distribution of income in Swaziland. 
 
Figure 2: Pre-fiscal incidence income distribution 






4.2 Analysis of Tax Incidence 
4.2.1 Overview of Swaziland’s Tax System 
In order to assess the impact of a government policy on inequality, it is important to identify 
the redistributive instruments available to the government. The revenue instruments relate to 
the tax policy and requires the evaluation of a government’s efforts to collect, allocate and 
redistribute resources in order to support a minimum living standard and reduce inequality 
and the expenditure instruments relates to the review of the expenditure programmes (Lustig 
2011).  
 
Tax income is a major source of revenue for the Swazi government; Table 1 below gives a 
summary of the government’s revenue over a period of six years. In the 2009/10 financial 
year tax revenue comprised 32.43 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product while non-
tax revenue comprised 1.63 per cent only of the gross domestic product. Tax revenue 
remained the highest source of income up to the 2014/15 financial year end. During this 
financial year the tax revenue constituted 35.45 per cent of the gross domestic product with 
non-tax revenue making up 0.92 per cent only of the gross domestic product. Swaziland is a 
member of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). The revenue derived from this 
union made up 57 per cent of the total government revenue in the 2009/10 financial year and, 
in the 2014/15 financial year, it made up 55.6 per cent of the total government revenue. This 








Table 1: Government Revenue Collections to GDP from 2009/10 to 2014/16 
Source: Own calculations based on the Swaziland Revenue Authority 2014 Annual Report, the 2009/10 to 2016/17 budget 
estimates book and the Central Statistics Office  
 
Figure 3, below confirms that the main source of revenue for the government was indirect 
taxes, followed by the direct taxes while the least revenue was derived from the non-tax 
revenue.  Figures 3 and 4 give a breakdown of the direct and indirect taxes and according to 
Figure 4 government earned the highest direct taxes from the personal income taxes and 
corporate taxes. However, during the 2012/13 financial year a decline in these sources of 
revenue was observed. The Swaziland Revenue Authority (2013) attributed this decline to 
both a low level of compliance regarding the filling of income tax returns by companies 
during this period and the salary freeze for people in civil service.  
 
In the subsequent financial year an improvement was observed in the personal income tax 
revenue as the government had reviewed the salaries of its employees and parastatals. The 
improvement in corporate taxes was attributed to the improved profits of export companies as 
well as the improvement in the level of compliance regarding the filing of returns, (Swaziland 
Revenue Authority, 2014).  
 
  2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
Total Government Revenue 34.07% 26.84% 25.73% 38.88% 36.97% 36.37% 
Tax Revenue 32.43% 25.73% 25.89% 36.59% 36.85% 35.45% 
Direct Taxes 8.64% 9.80% 9.72% 7.65% 9.11% 8.63% 
Personal Income Tax 4.98% 5.62% 5.64% 4.37% 5.12% 4.86% 
Corporate Tax 2.65% 2.96% 2.98% 2.41% 3.13% 2.93% 
Graded Tax 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
Other Income Taxes 1.01% 1.20% 1.09% 0.86% 0.87% 0.83% 
Indirect Taxes 23.56% 15.77% 16.01% 28.82% 27.64% 26.72% 
Sales Tax/Value Added Tax 3.73% 4.87% 4.82% 5.70% 5.06% 4.81% 
Fuel Levy 0.34% 0.57% 0.74% 0.12% 1.60% 1.62% 
Property Taxes 0.06% 0.11% 0.08% 0.09% 0.08% 0.08% 
SACU Receipts 19.42% 10.21% 10.37% 22.91% 20.89% 20.21% 
Other Indirect Taxes 0.23% 0.16% 0.17% 0.11% 0.10% 0.10% 
Sugar Export Levy 0.07% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Road Tolls 0.09% 0.09% 0.10% 0.09% 0.08% 0.08% 
Lotteries and Gaming 0.08% 0.07% 0.07% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 






Figure 5  presents a breakdown of the indirect taxes and shows that the collection of value 
added tax (VAT) continued to improve since it was launched in 2012. Nevertheless, the 
Swaziland Revenue Authority is continuing to raise awareness about this tax in order to 
improve compliance with the VAT statute and increase the revenue from this source. In the 
2013/14 financial year-end a significant increase in the tax generated from the fuel levy was 
observed, this was due to the 100 per cent increase in the levy from E1 to E2 per litre 
(Swaziland Revenue Authority, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 3: Government Revenue Allocation  








Figure 4: Direct Taxes 





Figure 5: Indirect Taxes 







4.2.2 Personal Income Tax Incidence  
In order to determine the incidence of personal income tax on households, data relating to 
household income was obtained from the SHIES 2010 survey while the tax rates applied were 
obtained from the Income Tax Order, 1975. As a result of the fact that personal income tax 
rates change regularly, the income tax rates applicable to the income earned during the 
2009/10 financial year were obtained from the individual income tax filling returns for that 
year. The incidence results are presented in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Personal Income Tax Incidence 
Welfare decile 
 Share of Personal  
Gross Income Gross Income Income  
  Tax Effective tax rate 
1     E4,134,590 0.90% E305 0.01% 
2     E7,574,143 1.65% E4,270 0.06% 
3     E8,609,187 1.87% E4,769 0.06% 
4 E13,306,432 2.90% E31,131 0.23% 
5 E15,652,326 3.41% E169,339 1.08% 
6 E18,631,506 4.06% E264,934 1.42% 
7 E19,429,817 4.23% E489,740 2.52% 
8 E25,982,786 5.66% E1,458,114 5.61% 
9 E99,051,422 21.57% E2,215,347 2.24% 
10   E246,802,179 53.75% E10,894,137 4.41% 
Total E459,174,388 100.00% E15,570,522 17.64% 
Source: Own calculations based on SHIES 2010 income data and the Swaziland Income Tax Order, 1975 
PIT:  Personal Income Tax 
E:     Emalangeni (Swaziland’s local currency, it is equivalent to the South African Rand) 
 
According to Table 2 above, Swaziland’s personal income tax may be deemed to be 
progressive as the effective tax rate increases with an increase in income and, thus, a larger 
proportion of the income tax is collected from the higher income earners. In addition, the 
proportion of income used to pay tax also increases with the increase in income. The tax is 
also progressive at all deciles as the proportion of the tax paid is lower than the market share 
of income in all the deciles. Although the PIT is progressive, the burden falls more heavily on 
the households in the 8th decile as, in that decile, the share of the market income is 5.66 per 
cent while the proportion of tax paid by these households is slightly below their market share 
of income by 5 percentage points. The progressivity in the income tax is influenced primarily 
by the fact that, in terms of the income tax law, people earning an annual income below E41, 
000 are exempt from income tax while the income tax order allows for an annual rebate of E8 







Although the PIT is considered to be progressive, both the tax exemption and the tax rebate 
have resulted in the country having a narrow income tax base from which to collect the PIT. 
This narrow tax base also means that the government is losing the income that it requires to 
finance its economic activities. In addition, this narrow base could also be seen as the result of 
the level of income inequality in the country as the larger share of the country’s income is 
concentrated among the few high income earners and it is, thus, not evenly distributed 
throughout the population. Although broadening the income tax base by reducing the exempt 
income tax levels and the tax credit may be advantageous for the government of Swaziland, as 
this would enable the government to increase its tax revenue, it may also have a negative 
impact on the redistributive ability of the tax policy, thus leading to an increase in the poverty 
levels in the country as a result of the reduction in disposable income, especially as regards 
the low income households. However, it is possible to achieve a broader tax base that does not 
negatively affect the redistributive ability of a tax policy by levying taxes on other activities 
such as the consumption of goods and services or the use of other public facilities such as 
public roads.  
4.2.3 Graded Tax Incidence 
Graded tax is considered to be a regressive tax as citizens who are employed are required to 
pay the annual E18 (equivalent to E1.5 per month) regardless of their level of income. 
Unemployed male citizens are also required to pay this tax. The burden of this tax falls 
heavily on both the low-income earners and the unemployed. In addition, this tax generates 
very little revenue for the country. In the 2013/14 financial year budget speech, the 
Honourable Minister of Finance strongly articulated his concerns regarding the efficiency of 
this tax and indicated the government’s plan to phase the tax out as it is deemed to be unfair to 
both the poor and the unemployed as they accumulate arrears for each year that they do not 
pay. In fact the costs that the government incurs collecting the tax exceeds the revenue 






Table 3: Graded Tax Incidence 
Welfare Decile Share of Gross Graded  Tax as a Proportion 
  Income Tax of Income 
    E   
1 0.90% 13,523 0.33% 
2 1.65% 13,209 0.17% 
3 1.87% 9,357 0.11% 
4 2.90% 8,793 0.07% 
5 3.41% 8,694 0.06% 
6 4.06% 7,767 0.04% 
7 4.23% 7,296 0.04% 
8 5.66% 5,459 0.02% 
9 21.57% 4,604 0.00% 
10 53.75% 3,216 0.00% 






Table 3 above confirms that the graded tax is regressive as the tax, as a proportion of income, 
declines when moving from the poorer deciles to the richer deciles with the result that the 
poorer households bear the highest burden of this tax. 
4.2.4 Combined Direct Taxes 
In order to assess the overall direct tax incidence on households, the personal income tax and 
the graded tax were added together. It was observed that the regressive graded tax did not 
impact significantly on the overall progressivity of the direct income tax.  However, the 
graded tax increased the direct tax burden on the poor households although the overall tax 
incidence was still less than the households’ share of gross income.  
Table 4, shows that the country’s direct tax is progressive up to decile 7 as the post-tax share 
of income for households in decile 1 to decile 7 is higher than the pre-tax share of income. 
However, households in decile 8 bear the highest burden of the personal income tax when 
compared to the poorer and the richer decile households. The redistributive impact of the 
direct tax was also confirmed by the reduction in the share of income for the households in 
deciles 8 to 10.  














1 0.90% 0.007% 0.33% 0.334% 0.93% 
2 1.65% 0.056% 0.17% 0.230% 1.70% 
3 1.87% 0.055% 0.11% 0.164% 1.94% 
4 2.90% 0.234% 0.07% 0.300% 2.99% 
5 3.41% 1.082% 0.06% 1.138% 3.49% 
6 4.06% 1.422% 0.04% 1.464% 4.14% 
7 4.23% 2.521% 0.04% 2.559% 4.27% 
8 5.66% 5.612% 0.02% 5.633% 5.53% 
9 21.57% 2.237% 0.00% 2.242% 21.83% 
10 53.75% 4.414% 0.00% 4.415% 53.18% 
 
Table 5: Combined Direct Tax Indices 
 














    
 0.7909 0.8419 0.0510 0.0486 0.7423 







The indices in Table 5 above were calculated to assess the overall progressivity of the direct 
taxes. The overall progressivity of the direct tax income was confirmed by both the positive 
Kakwani index of 0.05 and the positive Reynold-Smolensky index of 0.05. Figure 6 below 
also confirmed that overall direct taxes were progressive as the share of income across all 
deciles except for decile 8 where the proportion of taxes paid by the households in this decile 
was higher than the households’ share of income. Figure 6 confirmed the inequality in the 
distribution of income as the share of income increases gradually from the poorest deciles up 
to decile 8 after which a significant increase in the share of income was observed for 
households in deciles 9 and 10 – the richest households. The results in Figure 6 show that 




Figure 6: Income Distribution and Direct Taxes 
 
Cubero & Hollar (2010) indicate that, where the concentration curve consistently lies below 
the Lorenz curve, the tax is considered progressive. However, where the concentration curve 
crosses the Lorenz curve and it is not possible to assess the overall progressivity, the quasi-
Gini coefficient may be used to assess the progressivity. Figure 7 below shows that the direct 
taxes concentration curve was not consistently below the Lorenz curve, thus implying that it 






deciles 4 and 8 where the households’ share of disposable income was lower than their share 
of the combined direct taxes. 
 
Figure 7: Direct Taxes Concentration Curve 
 
4.2.5 Indirect Tax Incidence 
In determining the indirect tax incidence, Lustig & Higgins (2013) indicate that, in order to 
determine the progressivity of an indirect tax accurately, in cases where the survey being used 
contained data on consumption and income, indirect taxes should be simulated using 
consumption and not income. Lustig & Higgins (2013) further indicate that, if the welfare 
measure being used is income, the statutory tax rates should first be applied to the 
consumption items in order to determine the overall portion of consumption paid as indirect 
taxes. Although income was used as a welfare measure in this study, the indirect tax incidence 
results were presented on both the income and the expenditure welfare measures in order to 
show how both these welfare measures yielded different incidence results. According to the 
World Bank (2014), the consumption decisions of households are based on the households’ 
disposable income, which is gross income less direct tax plus any cash transfers if present, 
meaning that households consume significantly more than they would have consumed if their 
consumption had been based only on their market income. The indirect tax incidence for the 
purposes of this study was also based on disposable income. However, disposable income was 
based on the households’ gross income less personal income taxes and graded taxes. This 
limitation was a result of the fact that, as regards the collection of income data, the SHIES 






income received by households as direct transfers. Figures 8 and 9 below present a 
comparison of the consumption baskets of poor households and rich households. The poor 
households are represented by households in deciles 1 and 2 while the rich households are 
represented by households in deciles 9 and 10. Households incur indirect taxes through their 
consumption of various goods and services. 
























  Figure 9: Rich Households Consumption Basket 
a. Sales Tax/Value Added Tax   
In order to broaden the country’s tax base without negating the progressivity of the income 
tax system, Swaziland adopted a value-added-tax (VAT) policy with effect from April 2012. 
This tax reform was also driven by the need to improve the country’s revenue as the previous 
General Sales Tax (GST) policy or legislation that had been in place was found to be 
inefficient in promoting the collection of the required revenue, while the number of 
exemptions had resulted in pervasive sales tax evasion (World Bank, 2010). The World Bank 
(2010) revealed that Swaziland was the least effective country with regard to the collection of 
sales tax revenue. When compared with the other SACU member states, Swaziland’s sales tax 
collection in 2010 was 30 per cent of GDP, while the SACU average was 46.3 per cent.  Sales 
tax collection in Swaziland was equivalent to 28.8 per cent of household consumption while 
the SACU average was 57.5 per cent. These inefficiencies meant that the government was 
forfeiting much-needed revenue while, at the same time the SACU revenues were declining 
(World Bank 2010). This situation compelled the government to increase its sales tax revenue 
and also to minimise the provisions that had made sales tax evasion prevalent.  The adoption 
of a VAT policy was necessary for the government of Swaziland for the following reasons 
which Prasad (2008) cited as reasons for the adoption of VAT policies by many of the 
developing economies:  






b. Low/poor efficiency with regard to the collection of taxes which often leads to 
high tax evasion and revenue leakage. 
c. Indirect taxes such as VAT represent a simpler and easier way in which to 
collect government revenue. 
Although Swaziland introduced VAT in 2012, the changes in the tax rates were not significant 
as a sales tax of 14 per cent was levied on all expenditure items while basic food items 
remained zero rated. A sales tax of 25 per cent was levied on alcoholic beverages and 
tobacco. The difference in the effective VAT rate and the effective sales tax rate was, 
therefore, insignificant and yielded similar incidence results and, hence, the decision to apply 
the VAT rate to the 2010 household survey and present incidence results based on VAT. 
Table 6 below shows that, when household expenditure is used as a welfare measure, the 
VAT is slightly regressive as the poorest households bear a higher burden of the indirect tax 
compared to the richer households. However, when income is used as welfare measure VAT 
is slightly progressive as the poorest households bear the lowest burden compared to the 
households in the other deciles with the tax however falling more heavily on the households 
in deciles 7 and 8. 
Table 6: VAT Incidence 
Welfare Decile Welfare Measure 
  Expenditure Income 
1 12.28% 0.81% 
2 12.21% 1.27% 
3 12.20% 1.73% 
4 12.20% 2.09% 
5 12.09% 1.84% 
6 12.14% 2.21% 
7 11.78% 3.20% 
8 11.81% 3.42% 
9 11.66% 1.90% 
10 11.43% 1.96% 
Source: Own calculations based on the rates prescribed in the Value Added Tax Regulations 2012 
a. Fuel Levy 
According to the Petroleum and Fuel Oil Act (1968), all bulk importers of petroleum or fuel 
oil are required to pay a levy of E2.0 of fuel tax per litre, E0.20 of fuel oil levy per litre and 
E0.35 per litre to the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund. This means that the burden of a fuel levy 
of E2.55 is borne by the consumers through their use of fuel for various purposes. For the 






consumers through the use of various modes of transport although the fuel levy for household 
use only is E2.2.  
 
The fuel levy incidence focused on both the expenditure that households incur as regards the 
use of fuel for household purposes and the expenditure incurred for transport purposes. The 
fuel levy incidence was progressive on both the expenditure and income welfare measures 
although the expenditure welfare measure demonstrated greater progressivity compared to the 
income welfare measure. According to the expenditure welfare measure the highest burden of 
the fuel levy is borne by the richest households. The SHIES survey also collected data on 
asset ownership in respect of the households. According to the survey, 39.6 per cent of the 
assets owned by the richest households operate on fuel while only 3.0 per cent of the assets 
owned by the poorest households operate on fuel. This factor also influences the progressivity 
of the fuel levy. One other factor that influenced the fuel levy was the fact that the poorest 
households rely primarily on wood and paraffin as a source of energy and both sources of 
energy are not subject to the fuel levy. 
Table 7: Fuel Levy Incidence 
Welfare Decile Welfare Measure 
  Expenditure 
  
Income 
1 0.84% 0.06% 
2 3.72% 0.05% 
3 3.05% 0.05% 
4 2.26% 0.05% 
5 4.12% 0.08% 
6 4.45% 0.10% 
7 10.94% 0.35% 
8 8.82% 0.30% 
9 9.78% 0.19% 
10 17.52% 0.34% 
Source: Own calculations based on fuel usage by households as per the SHIES 2010 survey and rates prescribed in the 
Petroleum and Fuel Oil Act (1968) 
b. Excise Taxes 
According to the Customs and Excise Act (1971), the excise duties payable by consumers 
include the following:   
 Spirits – 8.9 per cent per litre of alcohol 
 Beer – 8.2 per cent per litre of alcohol 






 Alcoholic fruit beverages – 8.3 per cent 
 Cigarettes – 16.1% 
 Fuel – 4% 
The revenue from these taxes is transferred to the SACU common revenue pool and therefore 
is not accounted for as part of domestic revenues. According to the Swaziland Revenue 
Authority (2014), the customs and duties that were collected at the country’s border posts and 
transferred to the SACU pool amounted to E163, 4 million during the 2013/14 financial year. 
This represented a significant increase from the 2010/11 financial year during which the 
receipts that were collected and transferred to the SACU pool amounted to E90.4 million 
only. Revenue accrued from membership of the SACU has proved to be important for the 
Swazi government because the contribution that the country makes to the SACU pool is 
significantly lower than the revenue earned from the pool. In the 2010/11 financial year 
Swaziland’s contribution to the revenue pool comprised 3.4 per cent only of the revenue 
received from the pool while, in the 2013/14 financial, year the contribution comprised 2.3 
per cent of the SACU receipts only.  The SHIES 2010 survey collected data on household 
consumption of alcoholic beverages and the use of any narcotic drugs and hence the decision 
to focus on the excise tax incidence analysis of alcoholic beverages and cigarettes. 
Table 8: Excise Tax Incidence 
  Welfare Measure 
Welfare Decile Expenditure Income 
1 0.33% 0.02% 
2 0.35% 0.04% 
3 0.24% 0.03% 
4 0.17% 0.03% 
5 0.21% 0.03% 
6 0.36% 0.06% 
7 0.23% 0.06% 
8 0.20% 0.06% 
9 0.13% 0.02% 
10 0.17% 0.03% 
Source: Own calculations based on alcohol and cigarettes consumption data collected in the SHIES 2010 survey and the 
rates prescribed in the Customs and Excise Act, 1971 
 
The excise levy incidence was regressive when expenditure was used as a welfare measure 
with the two poorest deciles bearing the highest burden of the tax while the two richest deciles 
bear the lowest burden. However, when based on income as a welfare measure, the excise tax 






burden being borne by the households in decile 6 to decile 8. The tax burden was lower than 
the market share of disposable income for both the income and expenditure welfare measures. 
 
The overall indirect tax incidence was progressive on both the expenditure and income 
welfare measures as the richest households bear the highest burden of the tax. The slight 
progressivity when income is used as a welfare measure was due primarily to the progressive 
VAT with a Kakwani index of 0.0001 and a progressive fuel levy with a Kakwani index of 
0.80834 while the excise taxes were regressive with a Kakwani index of -0.0239 as indicated 
in Table 10 below. The overall progressivity of the indirect taxes was also confirmed by the 
fact that the tax burden was lower than the income market share for all the income deciles. 
The results of the indirect tax incidence are summarised in Tables 9, Table 10 and Table 11 
below.  
 
Table 9: Overall Indirect Tax Incidence based on Expenditure as a Welfare Measure 
 




VAT Fuel Levy Excise Tax Combined 
Incidence 
1 0.93% 12.28% 0.84% 0.33% 13.45% 
2 1.70% 12.21% 3.72% 0.35% 16.28% 
3 1.94% 12.20% 3.05% 0.24% 15.49% 
4 2.99% 12.20% 2.26% 0.17% 14.62% 
5 3.49% 12.09% 4.12% 0.21% 16.42% 
6 4.14% 12.14% 4.45% 0.36% 16.95% 
7 4.27% 11.78% 10.94% 0.23% 22.95% 
8 5.53% 11.81% 8.82% 0.20% 20.83% 
9 21.83% 11.66% 9.78% 0.13% 21.57% 
10 53.18% 11.43% 17.52% 0.17% 29.13% 
      
Source: Own calculation based on consumption data from the SHIES 2010 survey and the tax rates prescribed in the 

















VAT Fuel Levy Excise Tax 
Combined 
Incidence 
1 0.93% 0.81% 0.06% 0.02% 0.89% 
2 1.70% 1.27% 0.05% 0.04% 1.36% 
3 1.94% 1.73% 0.05% 0.03% 1.82% 
4 2.99% 2.09% 0.05% 0.03% 2.16% 
5 3.49% 1.84% 0.08% 0.03% 1.94% 
6 4.14% 2.21% 0.10% 0.06% 2.37% 
7 4.27% 3.20% 0.35% 0.06% 3.61% 
8 5.53% 3.42% 0.30% 0.06% 3.78% 
9 21.83% 1.90% 0.19% 0.02% 2.10% 
10 53.18% 1.96% 0.34% 0.03% 2.34% 
Kakwani Index 0.0001 0.80834 -0.0239 
 
 
Source: Own calculation based on consumption data from the SHIES 2010 survey and the tax rates prescribed in the 
legislations relating to the indirect taxes. 
 
Figure 10 below assessed the progressivity of the indirect taxes. The indirect taxes 
concentration curves were drawn against the market income Lorenz curve in order to 
determine the extent of the progressivity. The conditions for welfare dominance could not 
hold as the indirect taxes concentration curves also intersected the Lorenz curves several 
times. This required the calculation of both the Kakwani index and the Reynold-Smolensky 
indices to assess overall progressivity. The indices are summarised in Table 11 below. 
 
 








Table 11: Indirect Taxes Indices 
 
        
Disposable Income 
Gini 
Quasi- Gini for 






   
  
 0.7423 0.7427 0.0004 0.0001 0.7422 
Source: Own calculations based on the results obtained from the SPSS programme that was used. 
 


























1 0.33% 0.01% 0.81% 0.02% 0.06% 1.22% 
2 0.17% 0.06% 1.27% 0.04% 0.05% 1.60% 
3 0.11% 0.06% 1.73% 0.03% 0.05% 1.99% 
4 0.07% 0.23% 2.09% 0.03% 0.05% 2.46% 
5 0.06% 1.08% 1.84% 0.03% 0.08% 3.08% 
6 0.04% 1.42% 2.21% 0.06% 0.10% 3.83% 
7 0.04% 2.52% 3.20% 0.06% 0.35% 6.17% 
8 0.02% 5.61% 3.42% 0.06% 0.30% 9.42% 
9 0.00% 2.24% 1.90% 0.02% 0.19% 4.35% 
10 0.00% 4.41% 1.96% 0.03% 0.34% 6.75% 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the SHIES 2010 survey 
 
 
Table 12 and Figure 11 show that Swaziland’s overall tax system is progressive. However, the 
system is not progressive at all income levels. Figure 11 shows that the system is regressive 
for decile 1, decile 3, decile 7 and decile 8 as the tax incidence for households in these deciles 
is higher than their market share of income. The Reynold-Smolensky index, which is a 
summary measure of progressivity, shows that the country’s indirect tax system based on 
these taxes is slightly progressive as the index was only 0.0001. The direct tax and indirect tax 
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Figure 11: Post-tax Income Distribution 
 
4.3 Public Expenditure Incidence 
For the purposes of this research the public expenditure incidence focused primarily on the 
Government’s spending on health and education, because of the positive impact which both 
health and education have on improving human development and also because of the 
Government’s commitment to funding these expenditure items by allocating to them funds 
equivalent to approximately 10 per cent of the country’s GDP. Essama-Nssah (2008) 
maintains that measuring the benefits accruing to households or individuals from publicly 
provided goods or services maybe complicated as the analysis may be applied only to 
assignable public expenditure of which the beneficiaries may be identified. In order to address 
this problem, Demery (2003) recommends that, for purposes of a benefit incidence analysis, 
the benefits from an expenditure programme should be valued on the basis of the unit cost of 
the provision of such benefits. This may be determined by combining information on the cost 
of provision with data on the usage of the relevant public goods and services. Demery (2003) 
further indicates that these estimates should be based on recurrent expenditure. Hence this 
research used recurrent expenditure only to determine unit costs as it was not possible to 








Mtei et al. (2010) conducted research in Tanzania to determine who bears the burden of 
healthcare financing. In their paper they identified the following three sources of health care 
financing, namely, taxes collected from the public, donor funds and out-of-pocket expenses. 
The ability to pay principle was used in order to estimate the burden of the out-of-pocket 
expenses on households. The conclusion reached was that healthcare financing would be 
deemed to be progressive if the richest households contributed a higher proportion of the 
income to health care financing compared to poor households. The SHIES 2010 also collected 
data on household expenditure on both education and health facilities. In this study this 
expenditure was compared with the households’ income to assess the burden of financing 
these services on households. 
4.3.1 Education Spending Incidence 
Public expenditure in education is generally considered to be important for both poverty 
alleviation and the promotion of economic growth. World Bank (2006) indicated that an 
adequate level of public expenditure is crucial, especially as regards the manner in which the 
funds are allocated in order to ensure that the allocation benefits to those who need it the 
most. The World Bank (2006) also noted that developing economies face difficulties in 
deciding on the best way in which to allocate resources between primary education and 
tertiary education as primary education is considered to be more progressive and equity 
enhancing compared to tertiary education. Although tertiary education is considered to be less 
progressive than primary education it is closely linked to the improvement of human 
development, labour productivity and economic growth. 15 per cent of the Swazi 
government’s total expenditure comprises spending on education and the highest spending is 
on primary education, the government also faces the challenges confronting other economies 
of finding the best way in which to allocate its scarce resources between primary education 
and tertiary education.  
Table 13 : Government Spending on Education 
Primary Education
Secondary Education
Tertiary Education (Local university support, teachers training college support and scholarships)
Total Formal Education Spending
Other Education Spending
Support for vocational training, adult education, non-formal 




2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012 2012/2013
E E E E
705,941,698 798,797,219 824,231,610 876,385,504
536,446,415 606,283,860 607,896,860 673,020,478
307,616,852 285,461,232 302,679,386 287,348,825
1,550,004,965 1,690,542,311 1,734,807,856 1,836,754,807
60,558,654 81,147,755 81,871,892 87,360,703
1,610,563,619 1,771,690,066 1,816,679,748 1,924,115,510
10,935,357,000 10,347,335,000 10,705,472,000 11,350,196,000
14.73% 17.12% 16.97% 16.95%  






Figure 12 below gives a background of Swaziland’s schooling system as reflected in the 
annual education census report for 2010. The figure also shows that government funds a 
majority of the schools in Swaziland. The community and government owned schools refer to 
those schools to which the members of the communities in which the schools are based made 
cash and in kind contributions towards the establishment of such schools. The mission 
government aided and the private government aided schools comprise those schools that 
receive support from the government either through the payment of teachers’ salaries and/or 
the provision of educational equipment and other school utilities. 
 
 
Figure 12: Swaziland’s Education Landscape 
Source: Annual Education Census Report 2010 
 
Table 14: Unit Estimation of Education Subsidy 
Usage of Education Facilities 2009/10
Government Expenditure (Amounts in Emalangeni)
Enrolment Rates 
Annual Estimated Unit Subsidy






243.87 503.14 4,641.45  
Source: Own calculations based on data from the government budget and the education annual education report 
Although the government funds education, the users of the educational services are 
nevertheless, expected to pay school fees except in the case of free primary education.  
When deriving the unit subsidies for benefit incidence analysis revenue from cost 
recovery should be netted out of the government spending especially if the cost 
recovery goes back to the government as this means that the in-kind subsidy to the 






the service for upkeep then it should not be netted out as it adds value to the service 
that the households will receive (Demery 2000:15). 
For the purposes of this research the fees payable to the education facilities were not netted 
out as the revenue remains within the facilities in order to supplement the government’s 
funding. When carrying out the SHIES survey in 2010, the data collected was estimated for a 
single month such that where households had recorded their annual spending, this was divided 
by 12 in order to estimate the monthly average (Central Statistics Office 2010). In estimating 
the unit subsidies, the annual education subsidy based on the annual government expenditure 
on education and the annual enrolment rates was also divided by 12 in order to ensure that the 
subsidy was comparable with the household income and expenditure data. 
4.3.2 Primary Education 
In order to assess the primary education benefit that accrues to the households, the unit 
subsidy calculated in Table 14 above was multiplied with the usage rate reported by the 
households, that is, the number of primary school going children reported by the households. 
The results are presented in Table 15 below. 
 
Table 15: Primary Education Benefit Incidence 
 
Welfare Decile Usage Subsidy Share of Share of 
    E Subsidy Income 
1 4244 1,034,687 6.09% 2.51% 
2 6907 1,683,927 9.91% 22.23% 
3 8160 1,989,408 11.71% 23.11% 
4 8935 1,772,426 10.43% 13.32% 
5 7270 2,029,391 11.94% 12.97% 
6 8324 2,029,391 12.33% 10.89% 
7 8594 2,095,217 12.33% 10.78% 
8 5978 1,457,436 8.58% 1.47% 
9 7408 1,806,070 10.63% 1.82% 
10 4485 1,093,443 6.44% 0.44% 
Source: Own calculations based on households’ usage of primary education facilities as per the SHIES 2010 survey 
Public spending on primary education is not progressive as the poorest decile obtains the least 
subsidy compared to the other deciles. The primary education subsidy represents only 2.51 
per cent of the income of the poorest households. The major reason for the non-progressivity 
of the education spending is the fact that the poorest households demonstrate the lowest usage 
of the education facilities. This may be an indication that although the government has 
adopted the free primary education policy for all, out-of-pocket education expenses such as 






are not able to afford to send their children to school.  Households between deciles 3 and 9 
demonstrate the highest usage of the primary public education facilities and therefore benefit 
most from the education subsidy. The benefit that accrues to the richest households is similar 
to the benefit that accrues to the poorest households. This is also because of the low usage of 
public primary education by the richer households. The richer households tend to send their 
children to private schools and, therefore, they do not benefit from the public primary 
education subsidy.  
 
Ministry of Economic Planning and Development  (2010) observed that the out-of-pocket 
expenses required to cover the other costs associated with attending school tend to be 
unaffordable for the poor households while, in some cases, the households withdraw children 
from school so that they can start working in order to help support their families. In their 
report Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (2010) also indicated that although 
the government’s policy stipulated that no child should walk for more than five kilometres to 
school, this continues to happen in the rural areas. This creates a challenge for the poor 
households as regards their children attending school as these households are not able to 
afford transport costs. The Ministry of Education (2010) annual report also revealed that a 
lack of money to pay school fees among households is the most common reason for school 
dropouts in primary schools, with 17.6 per cent of school dropouts being attributed to a lack 
of money with which to pay school fees and 21.03 per cent to family reasons. 
4.3.3 Secondary School Education 
The benefit incidence results for the public spending on secondary schools were similar to the 
primary education results with the poorest deciles receiving the least share of the subsidy 
while households in deciles 4 to 10 received the largest benefit. This result was attributed to 
the low usage of secondary school facilities by the poor households. Table 17 below shows 
that the progression rate from primary education to secondary education was the lowest in the 
poorest deciles; that is, deciles 1 and 2. However, the rate increased when moving up to the 
richer households with the highest progression in decile 8. This is also indicative of a poorly 
targeted education subsidy as the richer households were deriving the highest benefit 







Table 16: Secondary Education Subsidy 
Welfare Decile Usage Subsidy Share of Share of 
  
 
E Subsidy Income 
1 641 322,513 2.44% 27.58% 
2 1,380 694,333 5.25% 24.74% 
3 2,114 1,063,638 8.05% 26.92% 
4 2,719 1,368,038 10.35% 20.10% 
5 3,153 1,586,400 12.00% 23.05% 
6 2,588 1,302,126 9.85% 14.43% 
7 4,179 2,102,622 15.91% 16.91% 
8 3,574 1,798,222 13.61% 12.07% 
9 3,586 1,804,260 13.65% 6.75% 
10 2,334 1,174,329 8.89% 2.32% 
Source: Own calculations based on households’ usage of secondary education facilities as per the SHIES 2010 survey 
Table 17:  Progression rates from Primary School to Secondary School 
 
5 6 7 8 9 10
43.37% 31.09% 48.63% 59.79% 48.41% 41.79%
Welfare Decile 
Rate of Progression 15.10% 19.98% 25.91% 30.43%
1 2 3 4
Source: Own calculations based on the results in Table 15 and 16 above 
4.3.4 Tertiary Education 
Castro-Leal et al. (1999) carried out a study in Africa to assess whether the poor households 
benefitted from government spending. They observed that the education subsidy increased 
when moving up the education levels from the primary level to the tertiary level. The ratio of 
the secondary education subsidy was twice that of the primary education subsidy while the 
tertiary education subsidy was significantly greater than that of the other levels. Swaziland is 
also no exception to phenomenon as the tertiary education subsidy is higher than the subsidy 
for the other levels of education; it is 19 times the primary education subsidy and 9.2 times 
the secondary education subsidy. Tertiary education spending is also not pro-poor as the poor 
households do not benefit from it at all. None of the poor households reported any of their 
children attending tertiary institutions with the usage of higher learning institutions 
manifesting at decile 5 only. In other words, the richest households derive the greatest benefit 











Table 18: Tertiary Education Subsidy 
 
Welfare Decile Usage Subsidy Share of Share of 
    E Subsidy Income 
1 - - - - 
2 - - - - 
3 - - - - 
4 - - - - 
5 41 190,299 2.39% 1.22% 
6 45 208,865 2.63% 1.12% 
7 128 594,106 7.47% 3.06% 
8 303 1,406,359 17.68% 5.41% 
9 582 2,701,324 33.96% 2.73% 
10 615 2,854,492 35.88% 1.16% 
Source: Own calculations based on households’ usage of tertiary education facilities as per the SHIES 2010 survey 
 
In order to improve attendance at higher learning institutions, the government of Swaziland 
offers scholarships to students. These scholarships cover tuition, books, accommodation, 
personal allowance and a uniform allowance where necessary. Students are permitted to study 
either in Swaziland, South Africa or any African country. The scholarships are available to 
everyone, regardless of financial background. As indicated above, there is a low usage of 
tertiary education by the poor households. This means that the benefit derived from the 
government scholarships also accrues to the richer households. On completion of their tertiary 
training, students are expected to repay the government scholarships as soon as they are 
employed. However, the government does not have a recovery policy or mechanism in place 
to ensure that those students who were awarded scholarships repay these scholarships. 
Subsequent to the 2010 fiscal crisis, the government did not have sufficient funds to provide 
these scholarships and, in 2012, it embarked on an exercise to develop a robust system that 
would enable the government to recover such scholarships from everyone whose higher 






4.3.5: Combined Education Subsidy 
The results from Tables 15, 16 and18 were combined in order to assess the combined 
incidence of the education public expenditure on households. The results are presented in 
Table 19 below.  
Table 19: Proportion of Subsidy to Households and the Contribution of the Subsidy to Income 
 
Welfare Decile Primary Higher Tertiary Combined  
Subsidy as 
a 
  Education Education Education Education % of 
  Subsidy Subsidy Subsidy Subsidy Income 
1 6.09% 2.44% 0.00% 3.56% 32.83% 
2 9.91% 5.25% 0.00% 6.23% 31.40% 
3 11.71% 8.05% 0.00% 8.00% 35.46% 
4 10.43% 10.35% 0.00% 8.23% 23.60% 
5 11.94% 12.00% 17.68% 9.97% 24.32% 
6 12.33% 9.85% 7.47% 9.28% 19.00% 
7 12.33% 15.91% 2.63% 12.56% 24.66% 
8 8.58% 13.61% 2.39% 12.22% 17.94% 
9 10.63% 13.65% 35.88% 16.54% 6.37% 
10 6.44% 8.89% 33.96% 13.42% 2.08% 
Source: Own calculations based on the results from Tables 15, 16 and 18 above 
According to Cubero & Hollar (2010), when assessing the incidence and distributional impact 
of public spending it is important to distinguish between absolute incidence and relative 
incidence. They describe absolute incidence as the share of total spending received by each 
income group while relative incidence relates to the distribution of the spending relative to the 
distribution of pre-fiscal income. Table 18 above shows that Swaziland’s absolute incidence 
on education spending is regressive as the richer households receive the highest share of the 
subsidy. Households in decile 9 received 16.54 per cent of the subsidy; households in decile 
10 received 13.42 per cent of the subsidy while households in the poorest decile received 3.56 
per cent of the subsidy. However, the relative incidence demonstrates that education spending 
is progressive as it improves the income of the poorest households by 32.83 per cent while 
making a contribution of only 2.08 per cent only to the income of the richest households. 
The quasi-Gini coefficient for spending is based on the same concept as the quasi-Gini 
for taxes, however the quasi-Gini coefficient for spending lies between -1 and 1 with a 
negative value indicating progressivity in absolute terms; the Kakwani index, which is 
defined as the difference between the quasi-Gini for the spending and pre-tax/market 
income Gini, is also used to measure relative progressivity of spending where if K < 0 







The quasi-Gini for education spending in Swaziland was 0.60422. The fact that the coefficient 
is positive confirms that education spending in Swaziland is regressive in absolute terms. The 
K coefficient was -0.1867, thus confirming the relative progressivity of the country’s 
education spending. Although the country’s education spending was regressive in absolute 
terms, the spending did improve the income distribution as the income Gini decreased from 
0.7909 to 0.7185 after the education subsidy. This indicates that the RS index was 0.0724. 
4.3.6 Redistributive Impact of Education Spending 
The non-progressivity of education spending means that the country will struggle to achieve 
the free primary education for all.  In order to ensure that the education subsidy reaches the 
people who need it the most, it is essential that government supplements the free primary 
education with other subsidies that would encourage school attendance by the poorer 
households. In addition, government must ensure that the learning institutions are easily 
accessible to the students while the improvement of feeding schemes in schools, especially 
those in the rural areas where poverty levels are high, may also help to encourage parents to 
send their children to school.  
 
The high poverty levels also discourage households from sending their children to school as 
they use the children to help ensure that the basic needs of the family are met. In order to 
overcome this problem the government should consider adopting conditional cash transfer 
programmes that provide for the payment of a cash amount to every poor household that 
sends its children to school.  
Conditional cash transfer programs are some of the policies adopted by governments 
to use market-oriented demand-side interventions to support the traditional supply-side 
mechanisms of investing in health and education facilities for the poor; the programs 
have been adopted as they promote long-term human capital accumulation and can  
break the intergenerational transmission of poverty (Rawlings & Rubio 2005:29).  
Prasad (2008) refers to conditional cash transfers as a “magic bullet” owing to their ability to 
reach the poorest households quickly, their positive impact on human capital and their ability 
to reduce poverty and inequality, thereby breaking the intergenerational poverty cycle. The 
introduction of the cash transfer programmes would, improve the usage of education facilities 
by the poor households while, at the same time, fostering the reduction of poverty among the 







Free primary education is intended to improve literacy rates. However, comprehensive human 
development that will ensure that people are equipped to free themselves from poverty 
requires people with skills that will enable them to be absorbed into the country’s economic 
activities. This means that primary education alone is not sufficient for the improvement of 
human development as acquiring higher level education is also crucial. Table 20 below shows 
a low level of progression from secondary schools to higher learning institutions with 
progression to higher learning institutions being reported from decile 5 only and with the 
richest households demonstrating the highest progression rate from both the primary 
education level and secondary education level.  
 
According to the labour force survey that was carried out in 2010, the country had an 
unemployment rate of 40.6 per cent. 48.5 per cent of this rate related to people with primary 
education, 40.5 per cent of people with secondary education was unemployed while 11 per 
cent of people with a tertiary qualification were unemployed.  This high level of 
unemployment, especially among people with tertiary education, may also discourage 
attendance at higher learning institutions and, therefore, not improve the usage of tertiary 
institutions by the poor households. In order to address this problem, Ministry of Economic 
Planning (2012) recommended the revision of the country’s education curriculum to ensure 
that it was relevant to the country’s labour market. The Ministry’s report indicated that the 
low rate of progression to higher institutions required government to introduce vocational 
training at the primary level. 
Table 20: Progression rates from secondary education to higher learning institutions 
3.06%1.74%- - - - 1.34%
6 7 8 9 10
Rate of 
Progression 26.35%16.23%8.48%
Welfare Decile 1 2 3 4 5
 
Source: Own calculations based on the results in Tables 18 and 19 above 
 
4.3.7 Burden of Education Financing on Households 
If households use education facilities they are expected to incur out-of-pocket expenses for 
school fees, school uniforms, books and the other expenses that are required to support 
education. According to Mtei et al. (2010), out-of-pocket payment are generally regressive 
and damaging to the poor as only those who are able to afford them use the public facilities, 
thus benefitting from the public expenditure subsidy.  Table 21 below shows that the 
education out-of-pocket expenses incurred by households are slightly progressive in absolute 






moving up the deciles from the poor households to the richer households. The progressivity of 
these expenses, however, holds up to decile 4 after which the proportion of education 
expenses to income declines for the households in deciles 5 and 6. Households in deciles 4, 7 
and 8 bear the highest burden of the education expenses while the richest deciles bear the 
lowest expenditure. It is possible that the households in deciles 9 and 10 may demonstrate the 
lowest incidence of public education expenses because most of these households sent their 
children to private schools and, thus, they do not bear the incidence of public education 
finance. 















Share of  
Disposable 
Income 
    
 
  
1 4,120,763 85,073 0.71% 2.06% 0.93% 
2 7,556,664 249,581 2.07% 3.30% 1.70% 
3 8,595,061 407,181 3.38% 4.73% 1.94% 
4 13,266,508 782,062 6.49% 5.88% 2.99% 
5 15,474,293 725,493 6.02% 4.64% 3.49% 
6 18,358,805 762,978 6.33% 4.15% 4.14% 
7 18,932,781 1,402,651 11.63% 7.22% 4.27% 
8 24,519,214 1,471,503 12.20% 5.66% 5.53% 
9 96,831,472 2,211,860 18.34% 2.23% 21.83% 
10 235,904,826 3,960,732 32.84% 1.60% 53.18% 
Source: Own calculations based on the education expenditure and income data from the SHIES survey 
A comparison of the households’ education expenditure to income and the households’ share 
of disposable income, however, revealed that education spending was regressive in relative 
terms as the proportion of household expenditure to income was higher than the share of 
income for households in decile 1 to decile 8.  Universal indices were calculated to determine 
the overall redistributive effect of education spending on households. It was observed that 
education expenditure is regressive as it has a positive quasi-Gini coefficient of 0.7601 and a 
negative kakwani index of -0.0308. The indices are summarised in Table 22 below: 
 
















0.7909 0.7601 -0.0308       0.0411 0.7498 






Although expenditure on education is lower for the low income households than it is for the 
higher income households the spending on education by households remains higher than the 
share of income for the households in decile 1 to decile 8. For the poorest households the 
expenditure of education to income is 2.2 times the households’ share of disposable income 
while, for the richest households, the share of disposable income is significantly higher than 
the households’ proportion of income spent on education.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Education (2010) revealed that education user fees was 
the main reason for both the high level of school drop-outs and the low progression into 
higher education institutions. It is clear that the government of Swaziland will have to make a 
policy decision on the levying of user fees as the regressivity of these fees is having an 
adverse impact on the government’s objective of attaining the education for all. In order to 
improve enrolment rates, especially for children in low-income households, the government 
of Swaziland may have to consider the abolition of user fees. However, such a policy decision 
will require the government to realise that the abolition of the fees also means a reduction in 
revenue for the schools. In order to ensure that this lost revenue does not have a negative 
impact on the quality of education provided, the government will have to increase its spending 
on public learning facilities. If the government is unable to abolish education user fees 
completely because of limitations in its financial resources the government will also have to 
ensure that the user fees charged contribute to the improvement of both the quality of 
education provided and the learning facilities. Improving the access to learning facilities in 
the rural communities is also important, as it this would improve the usage of public 
education facilities by the poor households in the rural areas.  
 
In cases where low enrolments are the result of households withdrawing children for labour 
purposes, the government will be forced to rely on other social policies such as the 
conditional cash transfer programmes mentioned above. Nevertheless, the adoption of these 









Figure 13: Education Out of Pocket Expenses 
4.4 Health Spending Incidence 
According to Castro-Leal et al. (1999), the public subsidy of social services such as health and 
education is based on the  government’s objectives of equity and efficiency as regards the 
distribution of resources, with efficiency gains being realised when the subsidies generate 
positive external benefits such as human capital development and poverty reduction. A 
government’s decision to subsidise the provision of health services is intended to yield 
efficiency gains as the health status of people determines their quality of life, level of 
productivity and longevity. In terms of Swaziland’s National Development Strategy and the 
country’s vision 2022 strategy, the Swazi government also views health as an important tool 
for human and social development and has articulated its plans to improve it efficiency in 
providing these services. 
 
Due to the unavailability of the micro-data required for allocating the healthcare subsidy to 
households, a complete health incidence analysis could not be carried out. However review of 
the SHIES 2010 report revealed that there was a low usage of health facilities by the low-
income households in comparison to the middle and high-income households. The report 
showed that only 8.3 per cent of the people in poor households reported that they had 
consulted a health worker during the survey period while 17.9 per cent of people in the middle 
and high-income households reported having visited a health worker during the survey period. 
Despite the fact that it was not possible to carry out a complete health benefit incidence 






be regressive because, if people were to benefit from the government health spending they 
would have to use the facilities.  
 
In order to assess whether the costs incurred by households in accessing health care services 
may be a reason for the low usage of health facilities by the poor households, a health care 
financing incidence was carried out. In order to estimate the burden of health care financing, 
the health related expenditure that households reported in the survey was compared to the 
households’ income to assess whether the expenditure varies with the households’ ability to 
pay.  
4.5 Household Usage of Health Facilities 
According to O’Donnell et al. (2008), the redistributive effect of health care financing is 
realised if payments towards healthcare financing are compulsory and not dependent on 
utilisation. This may be achieved if healthcare financing is derived from tax revenues or 
compulsory public health insurance contributions. This means that, when assessing the 
redistributive effect of health care financing, all forms of financing, including out-of-pocket 
expenses, must be taken into consideration. In Swaziland, health care is financed primarily by 
the government by establishing and maintaining the health facilities, paying of salaries to the 
people running the facilities; user-fees are also levied on users of the health-care facilities. 
Private companies operate health care insurance schemes and membership of these schemes is 
voluntary and, in most cases, contributions are paid by employers. The SHIES survey did not 
break down the health care expenditure that the households incurred, whether such 
expenditure related to health care insurance contributions or the expenses people incurred 
when visiting the health care facilities. In view of the absence of a compulsory health 
insurance scheme in Swaziland, the health expenses recorded by households in the SHIES 
were assumed to relate to out-of-pocket expenses. 
 
Table 23 below shows that healthcare financing is slightly progressive as households in 
welfare decile 1 incurred a lower burden of healthcare financing. In addition, the expenditure 
on health care financing that households in this decile incurred was also lower that their share 
of income. The richest households, however, incurred the lowest burden of health care 
financing while households in deciles 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8 incurred the highest burden. The 
progressivity of health care financing may be assessed by determining the proportion of health 
care expenditure to the households’ ability to pay where the ability to pay relates to a welfare 






proportion of health care financing to the ability to pay measure increases when moving up 
from the poorest deciles to the richer deciles Mtei et al. (2010). Although healthcare spending 
to ability to pay is slightly progressive in absolute terms, the households in the poorest 
welfare decile demonstrated the lowest portion of health care expenditure while the richest 
welfare decile demonstrated the highest portion of health care expenditure. The proportion of 
healthcare expenditure to income was also lower than the households’ share of income for all 
the welfare deciles. This therefore indicates that health care financing relative to household 
income is progressive. 
 
Table 27 below shows that the health care financing through out-of-pocket expenses is not 
regressive as the share of total health expenses is lower for the low income households while 
the richest households bear the highest share of the health expenditure. A comparison of the 
households’ health expenditure to their income revealed that health expenditure consumes 
0.55 per cent only of the richest households’ income but takes up 0.65 per cent of the poorer 
households’ income. The government is, however, making efforts to achieve universal health 
care and improve the access to health care services of the poor households. The country is 
currently exploring the feasibility of prepaid health care through a National Health Insurance 
Scheme which will allow for the prepayment of health costs by households. 






















1 4,120,763 26,899 0.78% 0.65% 0.93% 
2 7,556,664 64,286 1.87% 0.85% 1.70% 
3 8,595,061 87,825 2.56% 1.02% 1.94% 
4 13,266,508 87,847 2.56% 0.66% 2.99% 
5 15,474,293 161,060 4.69% 1.03% 3.49% 
6 18,358,805 187,936 5.48% 1.01% 4.14% 
7 18,932,781 366,336 10.67% 1.89% 4.27% 
8 24,519,214 518,029 15.10% 1.99% 5.53% 
9 96,831,472 580,800 16.92% 0.59% 21.83% 
10 235,904,826 1,350,765 39.36% 0.55% 53.18% 
Source: Own calculations based on the health expenditure and income data from the SHIES survey 
 
Table 24 below shows that the health expenditure quasi-Gini coefficient was positive at 
0.8400 while the Kakwani index was also positive at 0.0491. These indicators confirm the 
progressivity of health care financing in Swaziland. This indicates that the richest households 






















0.7909 0.8400 0.0491 0.0463 0.7446 
Source: Own calculations based on the results obtained from the SPSS programme that was used.  
4.6 Combined Health and Education Financing Incidence 
The incidence of health and education expenditure is deemed to be progressive in absolute 
terms as the poorer households demonstrated a lower combined incidence of health and 
education expenditure compared to the richer households. The combined incidence of health 
and education increases when moving up from the poorer deciles to the richer deciles. 
However, the highest incidence is borne by households in the deciles 7 and 8. Nevertheless, 
the combined incidence of health and education expenditure relative to the households’ share 
of income shows that the incidence of health and education expenditure is higher than the 
households’ share of income from welfare decile 1 to welfare decile 8. This indicates that 
health and education spending is regressive in relative terms.  
Table 25: Combined Health and Education Financing Incidence 
WD  Share of  Education  Health  Combined  
  Disposable Expenditure Expenditure Incidence 
   Income Incidence Incidence   
1 0.93% 2.06% 0.65% 2.71% 
2 1.70% 3.30% 0.85% 4.14% 
3 1.94% 4.73% 1.02% 5.75% 
4 2.99% 5.88% 0.66% 6.54% 
5 3.49% 4.64% 1.03% 5.66% 
6 4.14% 4.10% 1.01% 5.10% 
7 4.27% 7.22% 1.89% 9.10% 
8 5.53% 5.66% 1.99% 7.66% 
9 21.83% 2.23% 0.59% 2.82% 
10 53.18% 1.60% 0.55% 2.15% 






4.7 Net Fiscal Incidence 
 
In view of the data limitations regarding the allocation of health spending on households, the 
net fiscal incidence was only able to assess the extent to which the government redistributes 
resources through direct taxes, indirect taxes and public spending on education. The 
government’s education spending is 2.3 times higher than the health spending, therefore, the 
non-inclusion of health spending may not have a significant impact on the overall fiscal 
incidence results. Figure 14 below show that, despite the fact that government spending on 
education was pro-rich; it has improved both the income for the poor households by 31.9 per 
cent and their share of income by 0.26 percentage points. The income for the richest 
households has been reduced by 4.75 per cent while their share of income was also reduced 
by 3.77 per cent. 
 











Post-fiscal Intervention Share 
of 
  of Income Income 
1 0.90% 1.15% 
2 1.65% 2.09% 
3 1.87% 2.44% 
4 2.90% 3.42% 
5 3.41% 4.03% 
6 4.06% 4.55% 
7 4.23% 4.89% 
8 5.66% 6.00% 
9 21.57% 21.46% 
10 53.75% 49.98% 
Source: Own calculations based on the results from Figure 14 
The taxes reviewed for this research, together with the spending on education, led to a decline 
in the Gini coefficient from 0.7909 to 0.7185 based on the 2010 household survey and the 
2010 government budget. Figure 15 below shows the impact of the taxes and the public 
expenditure on education on the Lorenz curve. The post-fiscal intervention Lorenz is closer to 
the 45 degree line of perfect inequality and confirms that the country’s tax policy and 
education expenditure policy are redistributing income. Figures 14 and 15 shows that 
households in decile 3 to decile 7 demonstrated the highest improvement in the share income, 













CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
The study set out to assess the extent to which the government of Swaziland has been able to 
use its fiscal policy to redistribute resources and reduce the level of inequality in the country. 
The study reviewed the country’s tax policy, government spending on education and the user 
fees levied on the use of health and education facilities. The study assessed both the ability of 
the government’s direct and indirect tax policies to redistribute resources from the rich to the 
poor, the extent to which public expenditure was benefitting the poor households more than 
the rich households and the extent to which the rich households were bearing a higher burden 
of user fees compared to the poor households. The study also reviewed the extent to which the 
fiscal policy may be used to realise the goals set out in the National Development Strategy as 
well as to achieve universal primary education for all and universal health coverage. 
 
The literature review revealed that the level of income or consumption inequality in a country 
has an adverse effect on both poverty and human development. The study noted that 
Swaziland has been struggling to reduce its poverty rate and improve the human development 
of its citizens. In terms of the country’s National Development Strategy Paper, the country’s 
main objectives are to move from the low human development category to the medium human 
development category and to reduce poverty by more than 50 per cent by 2015. The study 
also noted that the country is still struggling to achieve these goals. According to the UNDP 
(2015), from 2010 to 2015 Swaziland’s Human Development Index (HDI) has ranged 
consistently between 0.527 and 0.541. These indices indicate that the country has made very 
little progress as regards moving out of the low HDI category and attaining the top 10 per cent 
of the medium human development countries. The country’s poverty levels have also 
remained fairly high with the Central Statistics Office (2010) revealing that the poverty level 
had only decreased by 6 percentage points from 69 per cent in 2000 to 63 per cent in 2010.  
 
Although the country’s inequality measure has been used in previous studies which have 
employed data from the household survey that was carried out in the 2000/2001, this study 
sought to assess the level of inequality using income as a welfare measure as opposed to the 
use of expenditure as a welfare level in the previous studies. This study used household 
income data from the 2009/2010 household survey. The study found that the income 
inequality in the country was fairly high with a GINI coefficient of 0.7909. The progressivity 






which these policies are resulting in the redistribution of resources. The government of 
Swaziland also relies on user fees for health care and education as a source of revenue, thus, 
the study also assessed the extent to which these user fees affect the redistribution of income. 
 
Although there has been an increase in the extent of the resources allocated to health and 
education spending, the low usage of these public facilities by poor households implies that 
the benefits of these facilities accrue to the rich households. The Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development (2010) indicated that the country was still struggling to achieve its 
goal of universal primary education as a result of the high level of school drop outs caused by 
the inability of poor households to afford school fees. The Ministry of Education (2010) 
revealed that this situation was particularly prevalent in the rural communities.  
 
Although the Swazi government has introduced free primary education, the poor households 
are still struggling to send their children to school because of the other costs associated with 
school attendance. In addition, the high levels of poverty and unemployment are also affecting 
the enrolment rates as, in some cases; parents sometimes have to withdraw their children from 
school for them to work in order to help to support the family. In order to reduce the number 
of school drop outs as a result of schooling expenses, the government will have to allocate 
funds to other social programmes that will encourage parents to send their children to school. 
For example, the government should consider introducing conditional cash transfer 
programmes in terms of which the cash paid to poor households for sending their children to 
school could be used to support such families. This money may help to improve the well-
being of the families while it could also be used partly to pay some of the schooling expenses.  
Government will also have to improve the accessibility of the schools in the rural 
communities in order to minimise the costs involved in accessing these facilities. Government 
should also revise the current tertiary education scholarship programme. The study found that 
this programme is currently not targeting the poor households as there is a low progression 
rate to the higher learning institutions in the lower income households. In other words, the 
rich households are benefitting from the scholarship fund rather than the poorer households. 
In view of the limited government funds, the government should make the scholarship fund a 
revolving fund by ensuring that all the beneficiaries repay the money after they have 
completed their studies. Government should also ensure that people from poor households are 








Although it was not possible to assess the incidence of health care spending because of data 
limitations, the incidence of healthcare financing through out-of-pocket expenses in relation 
to the households’ ability to pay revealed that the proportion of healthcare financing to 
household income was low for poor households and increased with the increase in income 
when moving from the poor to the rich households. The study found that the richest 
households bear the lowest incidence of health care financing. The incidence of out-of-pocket 
healthcare financing was lower than the share of income for all the welfare deciles.  Figure 8 
and 9 revealed that when household expenditure was used as a welfare measure, out-of-pocket 
health care financing made up 6 per cent of the expenditure of poor households while, for the 
rich households, it represented 3 per cent of their expenditure only. Although the incidence of 
health-care financing through out-of-pocket expenses may be low, the government should still 
consider the other factors that result in a low usage of healthcare facilities by the lower 
income households. 
 
While the tax incidence results showed that the taxes reviewed were progressive, the country 
may not be able to rely on tax revenue only in order to redistribute resources. The study found 
that there is a narrow income tax base in Swaziland from which the government may generate 
personal income tax and SACU receipts are expected to decrease. More than two-thirds of the 
country’s revenue is generated through the SACU receipts and the significant decline in these 
receipts during the 2010/11 fiscal year left the country in a financial crisis. The government of 
Swaziland has limited revenue-generating resources at its disposal and this means that the 
government may not be able to implement the policies that would enable the redistribution of 
resources and the alleviation of poverty and improve the human development of its citizens. 
Gupta et al. (1998) found the following problems in implementing equity enhancing policies 
to be common in developing economies and it is thus possible that the government of 
Swaziland may encounter some or all of these problems also: 
 The desired level of spending may not be sustainable given a government’s resources. 
 The fact that developing economies have a large proportion of their population based 
in the rural and informal sectors and this proportion of the population has limited 
interaction with formal institutions, may make it difficult for the government to deliver 






5.2 Policy Implications and Recommendations 
In view of the revenue limitations that the Swazi government faces, restructuring of the public 
expenditure is important. It is essential that the government improve its focus on productive 
public expenditure that can help to improve the country’s economic growth. The government 
of Swaziland has been criticised for its poor allocation of public funds; World Bank (2006) 
observed that more than half of the government’s budget was used to finance the civil service 
wage bill, public order, safety and defence, while the government was also losing its revenue 
as a result of a lack of controls over its public expenditure. However, despite 
recommendations by the World Bank (2006), the 2009/10 fiscal year budget speech revealed 
that the government had not made any changes to its budget allocation, as the civil service 
wage bill for the financial year in question consumed 50.6 per cent of the recurrent budget. 
Nevertheless, subsequent budgets have shown that the government acknowledged that the 
civil service wage bill was unsustainable. Although this wage bill remains high the 
government had managed to reduce it to 49.8 per cent of the recurrent expenditure in the 
2012/13 financial year and, by the 2014/15 financial year, it had reduced to 44.3 per cent of 
the recurrent expenditure.   
 
Tanzi & Zee (1997) indicate that public expenditure policy and the budget policy are some of 
the factors that impact on economic growth, resource redistribution and reduction of 
inequality. Although the taxes reviewed in the research study were found to be progressive, 
the government of Swaziland cannot rely on its taxes for the redistribution of resources as a 
majority of its tax revenue emanates from the SACU receipts and these receipts have been 
projected to decline in the coming years. The level of public expenditure on education and 
health that will have the necessary impact on reducing inequality requires government either 
to generate more revenues than it is currently generating or to restructure its expenditure and 
institute strong controls over public expenditure management. Chu et al. (1995) recommend 
the use of empirical data to carry out a comparative review of the output indicators of various 
expenditures in order to determine whether the output yielded by the expenditure is in line 
with the government’s policy objectives for that particular expenditure. The government has 
to assess whether the expenditure on the civil service wage bill, military and police spending t 
the subventions to the loss-making public enterprises are yielding any economic gains for the 
country. If not, additional resources could be reallocated to the public expenditure items that 







The World Bank (2006) review of Swaziland’s public expenditure found that almost half of 
the state-owned enterprises had been making losses for several years and that the losses were 
supplemented by subventions from government to keep the enterprises operating. The 
subventions at the time were equivalent to 1.3 per cent of GDP. However, subsequent to the 
World Bank (2006) review, there has not been a significant change with regard to the 
spending on state owned enterprises despite the fact that the World Bank had made strong 
recommendations regarding the financial restructuring of several enterprises and the 
privatisation of others. Continued subventions to the loss making entities, the significant civil 
service wage bill, together with the excessive expenditure on military and the police, may be 
some of the areas of wastage on which the government should focus, and consider 
reallocating the funds from these programmes to programmes that promote human 
development and enable an equitable distribution of resources.  
 
With regard to the state-owned enterprises, the government should determine whether the 
outputs of these entities could not be efficiently produced by the private sector and then 
consider the privatisation of these enterprises. This may result in the generation of revenue 
from the sale of the enterprises, as well as improved service delivery while the funds that were 
used to sustain these entities could be reallocated to social spending that supports the 
achievement of Vision 2022 objectives. 
 
Although tertiary education is strongly linked to improved productivity which can in turn 
reduce inequality and poverty; for the government to benefit from such improved 
productivity, the spending on tertiary education should also support education that is in line 
with the country’s economic objectives and ensure that it is targeted to the people that need it 
the most. In order to make the scholarship policy sustainable and in line with the 
government’s policy objective of enabling the poor and low-income households to improve 
their level of productivity by ensuring that they acquire the relevant skills, it is essential that 
government ensures the policy is targeted at the households that need it the most and enforces 
the recovery of these funds as soon as people are employed. 
 
Employment opportunities in Swaziland are also limited. The Integrated Labour Force Survey 
for 2010 revealed an unemployment rate of 40.6 per cent with 10.9 per cent of the 
unemployed being in possession of tertiary qualifications. This has led to high levels of labour 






government was not benefiting from its education investment in this people. For the 
government of Swaziland to benefit from its fiscal policy under the current budget constraints 
and to ensure that it creates sustainable human development and protection policies, the 
restructuring of public spending and the alignment of public spending with the government’s 











CHAPTER 6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This study relied on data from the Swazi government’s national budget and the 2010 
household survey. The study did not conduct an assessment of the quality of health and 
education services that are provided. Public expenditure on education is deemed to be 
effective if it provides people with the skills that will enable them to participate in the labour 
market productively and also be able to cope with globalisation and technological changes. 
Education spending that is not in line with the country’s policy objectives will not yield 
economic outputs that promote economic growth and reduce inequality and poverty. It is, 
thus, recommended that future research assesses whether the current spending on education 
and the quality of the education provided by public institutions support the capacity building 
that will enable citizens both to participate productively in the labour market and to cope with 
globalisation and technological advancements, thus eventually contributing to the reduction in 
the inequality gap.   
 
In view of the data limitations regarding the usage of health facilities by households, future 
research should review the extent to which government spending on health is contributing to 
the reduction of income inequality. Future research could also assess the quality of the health 
services to assess the extent to which they are relevant to society especially the low-income 
households that are not able to afford to seek medical care from private health institutions.  
 
Swaziland is lagging behind in the progress it has made in achieving the human development 
goals as set out in the Vision 2022 strategic paper. In the near future it would thus be prudent 
for the government to review the reasons why it is still so far from attaining its human 
development goals as envisaged in the Vision 2022 and to assess how the redistributive ability 
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